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Formative Elements
in the Law of Sales:
The Eighteenth Century
ProfessorFriedmanpoints out that,though there was no law
of sales as such during the eighteenth century, many of the
elements of the commercial law of that period had considerable influence on the law of sales which developed later.He
analyzes eighteenth century cases which combined two formerely distinct bodies of law - the common law and the law
merchant of foreign trade. He concludes that the commercial
law of this period, like in every other period in history, was
neithera haphazardnor a purely logical body of law, but was
designed to meet the business needs of that period.

Lawrence M. Friedman*
I. THE PROBLEM DEFmum
The nineteenth century and the early twentieth century might
well be called the classical age of the law of sales. Within this relatively short period of time, the law of sales, as a "field" of law, had
its rise and fall. Before that period, there was obscurity; and today,
there is a tendency to merge the field into a greater mass called
"commercial law." During the classical age, however, the law of
sales stood on its own two feet; it had its own key concepts, its own
internal rules. Perhaps the most characteristic, or at least the most
striking, feature of the law of sales was the search, so much ridiculed
of late, for the point at which "title" passed from seller to buyer. In
truth, to the naked eye, nothing in the law of sales seemed as important as "title"; the whole field was treated by some text-writers
(and some courts) as a gloss on that concept, with its many ramifications.' Other concepts played a much smaller role. Possession
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. Louis University.
1. A very early casebook, 1 LANCDELL, A SELEcTION oF CAsEs oN SALEs oF PERsoNAL PoRaTr (1872), is divided into two main sections. The first, 620 pages
long, is devoted to the Statute of Frauds. The second, 400 pages long, covers roughly the ground covered by the first few rules of the UrNoRm SALEs AcT § 19 [hereinafter cited as U.S.A.]. The Statute of Frauds has largely been eliminated from
modern casebooks, but a great deal of space is still devoted to the passage of title.
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in the sense of a primitive physical grasp - seemed to have very
little relevance. Similarly, payment as such had not achieved central
importance. Yet possession (in some form) and payment (in some
form) are the battle-fields about which the controversies, in the
nature of things, must really turn. No one could care about a "title'
in the abstract. Indeed, the title-approach seems to be divorced
from the commercial realities which obviously underlie this field of
law. As a result, the law of sales strikes the observer as rarefied,
formal, even metaphysical. Its reasoning appears as irrelevant to the
market-place and counting-house as the rule of perpetuities to efficient usage of farmland. Logic and symmetry are there, but in the
twentieth century, these are not commonly accepted goals for a
system of law. Consequently, the field of sales has fallen into deep
disfavor. In a time of swift economic change, it is condemned as
atavistic, anachronistic, sloppy, and vexatious.2 Lawyers and scholars
were first content with sewing patches in the ancient fabric. However, growing tired of half-measures, they produced a more thoroughgoing overhaul, in the form of the Uniform Commercial Code.3
Here, in the Article on Sales, "title" is ousted from its palace to be
replaced with a homely and reasonable "contract" method of analysis. The aristocracy of outmoded rules is to be replaced by close
attention to the needs of the men who do business; merchant's law
is to become lawyer's law. It is true that critics have attacked this
phase or that of the Code; some have even found fault with its general structure. But few commentators, if any, disagree with its basic
premise, that the law of sales is unworkable and unworking, and
must be changed.4
It is not our purpose here to imply that the criticisms of the law of
sales are not well-taken; very probably they are. Nor is it intended
Thus in the recent edition of VOLD, CASES ON SALES (1949 ed.), about one-third of
its total length is devoted to the passage of title and allied problems. In very recent years, casebooks influenced by the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter cited
as U.C.C.] and more modem legal thinking exemplify a more functional approach;

the whole field of "sales" may eventually be submerged in the greater world of
"commercial law."

2. A prize-winning essay, Liberman, Opportunity and Challenge to Bring Commercial Laws in Step with Present Day Needs, 3 So. TEx. L.J. 99 (1957), describes
the common law system as "unwieldly, full of archaisms, and uncertain." This is a
fairly typical comment.
3. The literature on the U.C.C. in general, and on the Sales Article (Article 2) in
particular, is enormous. See especially Corbin, The Uniform Commercial CodeSales; Should It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821 (1950); Latty, Sales and Title and
the Proposed Code, 16 LAw & CoNTmp. PROB. 3 (1951); Rabel, The Sales Law in
the Proposed Commercial Code, 17 U. Cm. L. REv. 427 (1950); Waite, The Proposed New Uniform Sales Act, 48 Mic. L. REv. 603 (1950); Williston, The Law of
Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HxAv. L. REv. 561 (1950).
These articles discuss older drafts of the U.C.C., but their comments in general are

still cogent.
4. The sole exception seems to be Villiston, supra note 3, partly for nostalgic
reasons.
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to show the defects, such as they are, of the classical law of sales. It
is simply intended to explain certain features of that law. Apparently, the emergent law of sales chose to ignore some useful concepts
and to magnify some relatively useless ones. How did this happen?
Evidently, the law turned its back on business practice. If this is
true, why and when did it happen? Some light is shed by a look at
the antecedents of the law of sales, as understood in the eighteenth
century. In so doing, the relationship between law and business
usage must be carefully explored. Were these two areas of life really
sealed off from each other? The enthusiasm of the modem reformer
sometimes tends to decry law which, in its day, was necessary and
fruitful and whose only sin is obsolescence. To some slight extent,
this article may serve to clarify the law of that period.
II. TnE EIGHrEENTH CETurmy BAcKGROuND
The law of sales, as we know it, seems to be one of the newest of
the common-law fields of law. Standard texts and casebooks cite few
cases decided before the first half of the nineteenth century,5 and
those few are not in the main stream of events. Consequently, it has
often been stated that the law of sales began with a rush in the early
nineteenth century. This thesis has been most expertly advanced by
Professor Llewellyn, who couples it with the notion that the law of
sales is farmer's law, since its emphasis on "title" is "a farmer's reference, suited to a farmer's world. . .".. I But even a priori, this view,
for all its brilliance, is inherently unbelievable. Why should a "farmer's law" spring up suddenly in the midst of the industrial revolution,
where there was none before? Moreover, the subtlety and refinement
of the law of sales and its alleged extreme conceptualism fit in badly
with what one would assume a "farmer's law" to be like. Nor did the
judges suddenly become farmer-conscious; they were, in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as before, lawyers, middle
class to upper class in background, conservative in outlook. Their
interests were the interests of lawyers and merchants. They undoubtedly owned land but were hardly "farmers" in the ordinary
sense. "Farmers' law," if this implies conceptual primitivity, is certainly not the law of sales. Nor does the litigation of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries spring from the problems of direct agricultural
marketing. We meet with farm products, of course, but only as they
5. The oldest "title" case generally cited in casebooks is Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East
614, 102 Eng. Rep. 1425 (K.B. 1805). However, a few older cases in peripheral
areas are sometimes mentioned, such as Grantham v. Hawley, Hob. 132, 80 Eng.
Rep. 281 (C.P. 1616), announcing the doctrine of so-called potential possession.
6. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HAnv. L. R . 725, 732 (1939).
These ideas have had wide influence. See, e.g., BnAucHE & SUTHERLAND, CoaMIaMciA.

TRANSACnONs-T=XT--Fons-STAUrEs

23 (2d ed. 1958).
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are bound and baled on the docks, or stored in the hulls of ships.
Very rarely does the farmer himself -with the exception of the
large Jamaican sugar-grower - appear in the English or early American law reports.
In a sense, it is true that the eighteenth century lacked a law of
sales as such. There was no substantial mass of law called by that
name. Some of the rules which later became black-letter sales law
can be traced to the eighteenth century, but they appeared there under different headings. Blackstone devoted a few pages to the subject;
it was part of the law of "things." More particularly, his embryonic and
somewhat inconsistent treatment came under the general heading
of "contracts." 7 The eighteenth century abridgments similarly scat-

tered the law of "sales" among various headings.8 We might say, then,
that nothing existed but isolated rules revolving about the salestransaction, just as today, we have no common law of "automobiles"
but merely a number of rules which concern automobiles - rules
which are categorized under older, better-known common law
rubrics. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, indeed, judges
themselves complained that the commercial law had been mistreated. More precisely, they complained that the evidence in commercial
cases was thrown to the jury for consideration as an undifferentiated
mass 9 -in short, that custom existed, but not law. There is some
truth to such a complaint. We do seem to find only separate, uncoordinated holdings, developed in a more or less ad hoc manner.
A closer look, however, reveals that the law was not quite so haphazard. The scatter effect is caused by the contrapuntal play of at
least two distinct sources of law. One source is the old common law
(and its tributary statutes). Here we find certain problems, nowadays felt to be "sales" problems, treated with a somewhat different
emphasis. Thus Blackstone tells us:
If a man agrees with another for goods at a certain price, he may not

carry them away before he hath paid for them; for it is no sale without

payment, unless the contrary be expressly agreed. And therefore, if the

vendor says, the price of a beast is four pounds, and the vendee says he
will give four pounds, the bargain is struck; and they neither of them are
7. 2 BLACKSTONE, ComivxNTBIEs *447.
8. Neither Viner's nor Bacon's abridgment has any category called "sales" as
such. The material is scattered elsewhere-for example, under "property" in 18
VnmR, A GENEaRAL ABRmGMEr OF LAw AND EQurlv commencing at 63 (1743).
9. Justice Buller complained that in the middle of the eighteenth century "we find
that in Courts of Law all the evidence in mercantile cases was thrown together; they
were left generally to a jury, and they produced no established principle." Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T.R. 63, 73, 100 Eng. Rep. 35, 40 (K.B. 1787); see also 3 C,'mBELL, LivEs OF THE CIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 300 (1874); 12 HOLDsWORTH, A
HIsTORY or ENGLISH LAW 282 (1938). The practice may have lingered on somewhat longer in the United States. See, for example, Wood v. Roach, 1 Yeates (Pa.)
177, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 180 (1792). It must also be remembered that the "jury"
sometimes consisted of a specially convened jury of merchants.
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at liberty to be off, provided immediate possession be tendered by the
other side. But if neither the money be paid, nor the goods delivered, nor
tender made . . . it is no contract, and the owner may dispose of the
goods as he pleases. But if any part of the price is paid down, if it be but
a penny, or any portion of the goods delivered by way of earnest . . .
the property of the goods is absolutely bound by it; and the vendee may
recover the goods by action, as well as the vendor may the price of
them ....

1o

And again:
As soon as the bargain is struck, the property of the goods is transferred
to the vendee, and that of the price to the vendor; but the vendee cannot
take the goods, until he tenders the price agreed on ....
And by a regular
sale, without delivery, the property is so absolutely vested in the vendee,
that if A sells a horse to B for 10 . . . [pounds] and B pay him earnest,
or signs a note in writing of the bargain; and afterwards, before . . .
delivery . . . or money paid, the horse dies in the vendor's custody; still
he is entitled to the money, because by the contract the property was in
the vendee."

According to Blackstone, a "sale" was not "complete" without one of
two things - delivery or payment. However, earnest can be substituted for payment and partial delivery for whole delivery. A purely
consensual sale, without formality, is impossible; without one of the

prerequisites, the bargain cannot be "struck." By "property," Blackstone could not have meant "title," since he spoke of the "property"
in the "price." We shall see later what he did mean. In general,
Blackstone seems to have been talking about the necessary foundation (or conditions) for bringing certain kinds of lawsuits. After
what formalities could an action for the price be brought? After
what formalities could an action for goods be brought?
It is also apparent what kinds of sales transactions Blackstone had
in mind. When he spoke of tendering "immediate possession," he
must have been referring to face-to-face sales and to hand-to-hand
transfers. He could not have been referring to overseas trade. His
was the law which dealt with real transfers of things, with goods

changing place, and money changing hands on the spot, or at least
with some ritualistic substitute. It can hardly be coincidental that
these two things -

substitutes -

payment and its substitutes and delivery and its

are precisely the alternative formalities which can

exempt an oral sale from the Statute of Frauds.' The seventeenth
10. 2

BLAacsToNE, CoimENT~rF-s

*447-48.

11. Id. at 0448.

12. The history of this formality seems obscure; apparently, in earlier periods the
consensual sale was possible. See Simpson, The Place of Slade's Case in the History
of Contract, 74 L.Q. Rev. 381, 392 (1958); see also Rabel, The Statute of Frauds
and Comparative Legal History, 63 L.Q. Rev. 174, 180 (1947). An anonymous case
note in 3 Salk. 61, 91 Eng. Rep. 691, 692 (K.B. 1700) states that "by a bare agree-

ment the bargain may be so far perfected, without any delivery or payment of mon-
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section of the Statute of Frauds merely added a third substitute
formality for hand-to-hand sales, the memorandum in writing. 3 Indeed, an early' case construed the statute as applying only to handto-hand transfers ;14 and this concept remained the law for most of
the eighteenth century, although Lord Mansfield refused to apply
the statute to auction sales (which, while technically hand-to-hand,
were obviously too "commercial" for the common law rules)." Failure to comply with the formalities imposed by the common law and
Statute of Frauds prevented enforcement of a sale. And, of course,
an unenforceable sale can hardly be dignified with the name of
a sale.16
Thus, the common law of the eighteenth century, was not a law of
"titles," with rules for ascertaining when "title" passed but consisted
of rules for determining when a contract of sale was "complete"
enough, or correct enough, for rights of action to ripen. Different
rights might ripen at different times or under different circumstances. For example, delivery was not an absolute prerequisite to an
action for the price; earnest would do.' 7 However, to bind the seller's
creditors, delivery was necessary.' 8 Such distinctions, in result if not
always in theory, still characterize the law of sales.
Still another characteristic of the common-law element in sales
might be noticed here. The Statute of Frauds, as its title indicates,
relates to problems of fraud, fictitious claims, and the like. A nodelivery, no-payment sale, in a world of hand-to-hand transactions, is
not only hard to prove but is also suspicious. At any rate, such a sale
is not usual, it is not regular, and it suggests an attempt to deceive
ey, that the parties may have an action on the case for non-performance of the agreement, but no property vests till there is a delivery; and therefore if a second buyer
gets a delivery, he has the better title." This expresses the results of the legal doctrine better than the doctrine itself, and may reflect older strata in the law.
13. Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 17. The statute, of course, does
not refer to delivery as such but to "accepting" and "actually receiving" the goods;
but this is nothing more than delivery taken very literally and viewed from a somewhat different slant.
14. Towers v. Osborne, 1 Str. 506, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722).
15. Simon v. Motivos, 3 Burr. 1921, 97 Eng. Rep. 1170 (K.B. 1766).
16. See Alexander v. Comber, 1 Bl. H. 20, 126 Eng. Rep. 13 (C.P. 1788), where
the court held that "the Statute of Frauds prevented any property from vesting in
the plaintiff, so as to enable him to maintain trover, there being neither earnest, delivery, nor agreement in writing."
17. Curiously enough, although Blackstone's exposition reflected the law of his
day with fair accuracy, he relied chiefly upon earlier precedent, such as Noy's Maxs. For eighteenth-century cases concerning the
ims. See 2 BLACKSTONE, Co aonm=rr
necessity of payment or earnest, see especially Bach v. Owen, 5 T.R. 409, 410, 101
Eng. Rep. 229 (K.B. 1793) (unnecessary for plaintiff to show tender of goods, because property in the goods vested in defendant through payment of earnest);
Blakey v. Dinsdale, 2 Cowp. 661, 98 Eng. Rep. 1294 (K.B. 1777); Atkins v. Barwick,
I Str. 165, 93 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 1719) (stressing "consideration").
18. See note 12 supra.
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either the opposite party or creditors.' 9 For at least a century, the law
had been sensitive to unreal, that is, fraudulent, transfers. 0 A seller in
possession was one of very few common-law types of sellers with
whom the growing rules of bankruptcy were concerned.2 1 And even
this was a limited concern. In the eighteenth century bankruptcy acts
were for "traders only; casual sellers of goods were not included.2 2
But the problems of insolvency and fraud were universal; and the
law's solution, as often, was to insist on adherence to form.
In other, lesser ways, too, the law had reason to examine the
formal shape of a sale. For example, in assumpsit, counts for goods
"bargained and sold" and "sold and delivered," or both, were commonplace.3 But if the goods were not really sold, the word was
improperly used, and defendant had still one more defense to interpose. During the eighteenth century, the word "sold" does not seem
to have been used in a technical modem sense -that
is, as distinguished from "contracted to be sold." Still, the word had meaning,
and needed defining. Here, as in the other situations, such rules as
Blackstone restated were simple, objective, and relatively easy to
use.
They were also, no doubt, fairly adequate to meet the needs of a
limited area of English commerce. In the domestic sale, between
casual sellers, or at a shop, or during market-day, buyer and seller
occupy clear-cut roles. Quick turn-over, which merchants are supposed to favor, is not always necessary for this kind of commerce.
Broadly stated, the dominant problem is that of fraud. A buyer may
resell before payment, which is dishonest. A seller may sell goods
he does not own; this too is dishonest. But a merchant, that is, a
specialist in buying and selling, is interested in volume and profit
rather than in the pedigree of his goods. Therefore, merchants are
supposed to favor what we might call the negotiability of goods. A
19. See Tanner v. Barnett, Peake Add. Cas. 98, 170 Eng. Rep. 207 (N.P. 1796).
A buyer of wine allowed the wine to remain in the merchant-seller's basement. The
sale was attacked as void under the Statute of Frauds and as a fraudulent retention
of possession- successfully, as to the latter.
20. Landmarks, of course, are the Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances, 1571, 13
Eliz., c. 5 (now Law of Property Act, 1925, c. 20, § 172), and Twyne's Case, 3
Co. Rep. 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (K.B. 1601).
21. This was so because of the rule that retention of possession was void as to
creditors. Edwards v. Harben, 2 T.R. 587, 100 Eng. Rep. 315 (K.B. 1788); Bucknall
v. Roiston, Prec. Ch. 285, 286, 24 Eng. Rep. 136, 137 (Ch. 1709). A mortgage of a
stock in trade fell within the same ban. Ryall v. Rowles, 1 Ves. Sen. 348, 351, 27
Eng. Rep. 1074, 1076 (Ch. 1750).
22. The laws applied to anyone seeking "his trade of living by buying and selling,"
that is, merchants, middlemen, and manufacturers, but not, for example, farmers and
inn-keepers, who were not "traders." CooxE, BA ,,.oPT LAws 45 (1785). See Friedman and Niemira, The Concept of the "Trader" in Early Bankruptcy Law, 5 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 223 (1958).
23. See, e.g., Goodall v. Skelton, 2 BL. H. 316, 126 Eng. Rep. 570 (C.P. 1794).
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merchant doctrine such as market overt clearly favored a quick flow
of goods, with no questions asked. It protected the selling (and the
buying) merchant in the great fairs and markets which still re24
mained a feature of domestic commerce in the eighteenth century.
But the law merchant of market overt was a far cry from the law
merchant of foreign trade. For one thing, credit transactions were
less significant domestically, although this fact tended to change.
The common law could and did tolerate the institution of market
overt as a regimented vent for goods; but it could not tolerate its
expansion into a general rule. Precisely during the period when the
law merchant was being absorbed into the common law,25 the doctrine of market overt was being nibbled away at the edges. This
tendency had begun earlier but was accentuated in the eighteenth
century. 28 Non-documentary sales were not to be allowed to cut off
the rights of a defrauded owner or seller. Apparently the law recognized a separate "class" of sellers, as distinct from the merchants,
who after all both buy and sell. To protect this class, rights of owners
must be protected regardless of who has possession of the goods. In
the common law, a memorandum in writing, or the payment of
earnest, could serve as substitutes for delivery (that is, change of
possession) in certain cases. However, as it tumed out this was not
enough. Therefore, as the law developed, in harmony with change
in English economic life, conflicting interests appeared, which would
have to be bound up by some overriding conceptual network that
would be at once both flexible and powerful.
The expanding world of foreign trade was very sharply distinguished from the original simplicity of domestic trade. Legally, its
roots were not in the common law sphere, but in that somewhat
amorphous body of custom called the law merchant. The shape of
foreign business was worlds away from the common law face-to-face
dealing. All the parties were merchants; primary concern was not
with ultimate buyers and sellers. Typical transactions were not concerned with marketing as much as they were with finance. Sales
were documentary; at the crucial period, the goods were locked up
on shipboard. Any delivery, during the period of transit, had to be
documentary; the common law horror of fraud and retention of
possession was meaningless. The dominant fear of merchants was

not so much of fraud as of the insolvency of their debtors before
payment. Legally, the disputes were between general creditors and
particular creditors with respect to goods; and factually, the law had
to define and delimit the effects of bills of lading, the position and
24. ASHTON, AN ECONOMIC HIsTORtY OF ENGLAND: THE 18Ta CxiTY 63 (1954).
25. See Sutherland, The Law Merchant in England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 17 RoYA HIsToRicAL SocTy TRANSACTIONS 149 (4th ser.
1934).
26. See notes 155-61 infra and accompanying text.
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rights of factors, the power of a consignor to reclaim his goods, and
the like.
Superficially, the merchant law of foreign trade does not seem to
have undergone much development during the eighteenth century.
The forms of business, to the outside eye, varied less; a bill of lading
was a bill of lading, whether it listed sugar, woolens, or manufactured knives. Change did take place; but its silhouette was blurred
by the comparative scantiness of reported cases during a greater part
of the century. It is true that at the end of the period the reports
were much more extensive. But the thrust of the prior cases is
blunted by the incorrigible trait of lawyers to stultify the meaning of
embarrassing precedent. And most specifically, in studying the
eighteenth century, we are thrown off the track easily because of the
shift in meaning of one simple English word- "property."
We turn first to foreign trade.
A. Foreign Trade Doctrinesand the Concept of Property
One of the very few doctrines of modem sales law concededly
traceable past the barrier of the 1800's is the so-called right of
stoppage in transit. As defined in a modem work, this is the seller's
right "while the goods are in transit to resume possession if the buyer
is or becomes insolvent. 2 7 In other words, this is a right to stop
delivery of moving goods and reclaim them, if payment has become
28
impossible. The modern commercial statutes preserve this right;
but it is probably very rarely used.29 However, during the eighteenth
century, the right was of the highest order of importance.
The earliest case on record which supposedly refers to the right
is Wiseman v. Vandeputt,30 decided in 1690. In that case, stoppage in
transit was not mentioned as such. Italian merchants consigned silk to
the Bonnells, merchants in London, but before the ship left Leghorn,
news came that the Bonnells had failed; and the merchants then
"altered the consignment" of the silks to the defendant. The representatives in bankruptcy of the Bonnells claimed the right to the
goods. The chancellor, however, stated:
[T]he silks were the proper goods of the two Florentines, and not of the
Bonnells ... and therefore they having paid no money for the goods,
if the Italianscould by any means get their goods again into their hands,
or prevent their coming into the hands of the bankrupts, it was but lawful
for them so to do, and very allowable in equity.3 1
27. VoLp,

SAiES

236 (1931).

28. Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, §§ 44-46; U.S.A. §§ 57-59;
even the U.C.C. retains the right in § 2-705.
29. The digest shows almost no cases in recent decades; however, in the nineteenth century, reported cases were fairly common.
30. 2 Vern. 203, 23 Eng. Rep. 732 (Ch. 1690).

31. ibid.
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A number of points about Wiseman v. Vandeputt are worthy of
remark. First, the case does not indicate any "doctrine" of stoppage
in transit; it rests on a somewhat vague and common sense notion of
fairness- the sort that might be expected of the merchant community, and that would be persuasive in a court of equity. Second,
the case merely allows an unpaid merchant to scramble for his goods
as best he can, and says that the law will not discourage him; there
is an implication that actual possession is decisive. Third, there is no
trace of any concept of "title"; nor is there any mention of a bill of
lading; nor is there really any actual "transit," since the ship had not
left its dock at the time the buyers failed. Wiseman v. Vandeputt is
therefore a starting-point for the doctrine of stoppage in transit only
in the sense that it provides a citation useful for later attorneys, to
buttress what must have been at least an expectation, if not a custom, of merchants- that is, that goods not paid for need not be
delivered. This is "equity"; but as the doctrine took flesh to its bones,
courts, 32 a sign of its mercaneasily over to" the law
it moved
• * * rather
33
"€
tile origin. It was soon fortified with a name ("stoppage in transitu") and was extended to ships at sea.3 4

Despite the development, however, from a vague notion of "fairness" to a full-fledged "right," stoppage in transit retained the strong
imprint of its pedigree; as one court put it, "the goods of one man
There
should not be applied in payment of another man's debts.
is, of course, a strong instinct in law, especially in our period, to
become more systematic. The free-for-all aspects of the right to reclaim goods later dissolved. The unpaid shipper got the right to
resume possession, instead of merely being protected in possession,
if he resumed it on his own. In D'Aquila v. Lambert, for example,
a consignor was allowed to recover goods in an action against the
ship's master, who had refused to deliver to either party.36
32. See Assignees of Burghall v. Howard, 1 BI. H. 366n., 126 Eng. Rep. 21n. (C.P.
1759), where Lord Mansfield refers to the doctrine as resting "not upon principles of
equity only, but the laws of property."
83. Purely "equitable" doctrine would not have been as welcome in the law courts
as the "custom of merchants."
34. See Ex parte Wilkinson (unreported; Ch. 1755), cited in D'Aquila v. Lambert, Arab. 400, 27 Eng. Rep. 267 (Ch. 1761).
35. D'Aquila v. Lambert, Amb. 399, 401, 27 Eng. Rep. 266, 267 (Ch. 1761). The
quoted sentence shows clearly that in the eighteenth century the right of stoppage in
transit was not at first considered to afford a right over another's goods, that is, a
right in goods to which title has already passed. See note 100 infra.
36. Anab. 399, 27 Eng. Rep. 266 (Ch. 1761), 2 Eden 75, 28 Eng. Rep. 824 (Ch.
1761). The implication in Wiseman v. Vandeputt was that the first party in possession had the right to the goods. Thus, in an action against a ship's master for misdelivery, it should have been a good defense that the cargo was handed over against
a bill of lading, no matter who presented it. See Fearon v. Bowers, 1 B1. H. 364n.,
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Before long, however, it became impossible to consider the
development of the right of stoppage in transit without casting an
eye on that highly important document, the bill of lading. A bill of
lading, of course, is a document signed by the ship's master or other
officer, which receipts for the goods, lists them, and promises to
deliver to a named person (or to the shipper or his order, or simply
to "order") at the port of destination. During the eighteenth century, travel by sea was still slow. While the goods were at sea, the
bill of lading was the handiest documentary evidence of the existence of the cargo. If the goods were to be dealt with at all, the bill
of lading was the most convenient document for doing so. That
goods were assignable in transit by assignment of the bill of lading
seems to have been true much earlier than the eighteenth century.
As early as the sixteenth century, bills of lading contained a promise
to deliver to a merchant "or to his factor or assigns. . .

." 3

Assigna-

ble, however, is not the same as negotiable. Goods at sea could be assigned by other means than by transfer of a bill of lading. In 1540,
the Court of Admiralty referred to the assignability of goods afloat
by means of a bill of sale as a 'laudable ancient & lawfully prescribed custom." 3 And for certain purposes, the eighteenth-century
judges were willing to honor assignments of cargo at sea by bill of
126 Eng. Rep. 214 (K.B. 1753). In Assignees of Burghall v. Howard, 1 Bl. H. 366n.,
126 Eng. Rep. 215n. (C.P. 1759), Lord Mansfield is quoted as saying:
he had known it several times ruled in Chancery, that where the consignee becomes a bankrupt, and no part of the price has been paid, that it was lawful
for the consignor to seize the goods before they come to the hands of the consignee, or his assignees [in bankruptcy]; and that this was ruled, not upon
principles of equity only, but the laws of property.
No mention is made of a bill of lading in D'Aquila v. Lambert, supra note 85,
but the sale was almost certainly documentary.
37. II SaELEcr PL~s n-r Ta CoURT oF ADi,)MrATY 61 (Seldon Society, Marsden
ed. 1897). (Emphasis added.) The date is 1554. A seventeenth century bill of lading
("unto Edward Smallwood or to his assigns") can be found in Burrell 240, 167
Eng. Rep. 554 (Adm. 1650).
38. The custom was that
all and every contracte or sale of any shipe goods wares or other merchandyzes
made or had by any owner or proprietary thereof to any merchaunte or other
person (the same shipe goods wares or merchandizes being . . . within the jurisdiction of the King's Courte of his Admiraltie . . . and the byer of the same
. . . beryng the adventure and peryll thereof . . . and having a byll of sale thereuppon made and delyvered to hym by the seller) ys good and valeable and not
to be retracted or rescinded but that the said byer . . . aughte and may entre
and take possession of the said shipe goods wares or merchandyzes so sold and
boughte . . . and them take have and enjoy as thyr owne propre goods at theyr
retorne ad portum destinatum withoute any further tradicion or delyvery . . .
and not withstandyng the clyame title interest or arrest in them made by any
creditor or creditors of the said seller.
I SLr
PLr.As IN un CouT OF AnmnLrrr 98 (Seldon Society, Marsden ed. 1892).
The entry is dated 1540.
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sale 39 or other documents.4 Originally, then, a bill of lading might
not have been technically "negotiable"; it might simply have been
an instrument useful for tansferring an interest in goods afloat from
one person to another. For this purpose, it was clearly superior to
any of its substitutes. The bill of lading was simple, explicit, and in
universal use. It was standard in form. It was flexible, and could be
used for a great variety of purposes (for buying and selling, for
security transactions, for effecting insurance, and the like) between
various parties (a merchant and his agent, a buyer and a seller, a
borrower and a lender). On the other hand, a bill of sale, was not a
particularly appropriate document as between a merchant and his
factor; in fact, it was not particularly appropriate between anyone
but a seller (strictly speaking) and a buyer (strictly speaking), although it had some possible limited uses in mortgaging goods. Furthermore, captains of ships were accustomed to delivering their
goods against a bill of lading, and it was easy for the idea to gain
acceptance that the transfer of the bill of lading transferred the right
to receive the goods. This being so, the bill of lading made an excellent security to be pledged for raising money on floating goods. 1
Probably the use of the bill of lading as a financing device was
fortified by a quite accidental feature. Since the bill was the captain's
receipt for the goods, the cargo would not be unloaded until the captain, for his own protection, took up and cancelled one of the outstanding bills of lading. This gave the bill of lading some real substance; a pledgee had a swift and powerful means of realizing on his
security. Later, he also had reasonable assurance that no one else
could do the same.
A recent study has suggested that certain legal difficulties, centering about the bill of lading, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, were caused by a kind of cultural lag of lawyers. It is claimed
that the merchant community was quite clear on the functions of
the bill of lading, both as a trading and as a security device. However, when lawyers finally came to recognize that a bill of lading
39. Bourne v. Dodson, 1 Atk. 154, 26 Eng. Rep. 100 (Ch. 1740); see Ex parte
Matthews, 2 Ves. Sen. 272, 28 Eng. Rep. 176 (Ch. 1751). This was so even when
the "sale" was really a mortgage, since, as Lord Hardwicke pointed out,
[I]t would be very detrimental to trade, as it would deter merchants from lending money, if, notwithstanding they should advance a large sum by way of
mortgage, the property is not altered, but subject to mortgagor's creditors under
a commission of bankruptcy, unless the ships return before the commission is
taken out, and the effects are in the actual possession of mortgagees.
Bourne v. Dodson, 1 Atk. 154, 156, 26 Eng. Rep. 100, 101 (Ch. 1740). For the
meaning of "altering the property," see notes 48 & 49 infra and accompanying text.
40. Brown v. Heathcote, 1 Atk. 160, 26 Eng. Rep. 103 (Ch. 1746) (delivery of
unendorsed bills of lading and endorsed insurance policies); see also Lempriere v.
Pasley, 2 T.R. 485, 100 Eng. Rep. 262 (K.B. 1788) (written document, policy of insurance, and "letters of advice").
41. "lit is the custom of merchants to borrow money upon bills of lading, which
have been looked upon as a good security .... Snee v. Prescot, I Atk. 245, 246,
26 Eng. Rep. 157, 158 (Ch. 1743) (argument of counsel).
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transfers the "property," they were unable to consider "property" as
anything less than a unitary whole. Consequently, they were unable
to cope with the bill of lading as a financing device until well into
the nineteenth century.'
Unfortunately, there is some anachronism in this theory, although
it does soothe the lawyer's instinct for deriding himself. A careful
examination of the eighteenth-century cases shows no such unitary
view of "property" until the closing years. Nor was it clear, even to
the merchants themselves, precisely what the effect of the endorsement and delivery of a bill of lading was, or ought to have been.
The earliest reference in the common-law reports to the assignability of a bill of lading is a cryptic dictum in Evans v. Martell, in
1697."3 "[T]he consignee of a bill of lading," said Holt, "has such a
property as that he may assign it over."44 In that case,45 Evans, the
consignee named in a bill of lading, brought an action against the
ship owners when the goods were lost at sea. The defendants
showed, by means of invoices, that the goods were not Evans' at all,
but belonged to Harvey, the consignor; they claimed Evans was
nothing but a factor, and that the action should have been brought
by Harvey. The court disagreed; invoices signified nothing, but the
42. Miller, Bilis of Lading and Factors in Nineteenth Century English Overseas
Trade, 24 U. Cm. L. REV. 256, 267-68 (1957):
[T]he development of the bill of lading by the merchant and banking community as the central pivot of international trade finance was accomplished with
no great difficulty. For the lawyer . .. unfamiliar with commercial practice
...
this development was not so easy. This is not surprising when one considers that the structure of English life up to the latter part of the eighteenth
century was predominantly rural in nature.... The conceptual nature of legal
thinking... added to these difficulties. Much of the embarrassment...
stemmed from ... inability to see the concept of "property" as anything less
than a unitary whole. When "property" in goods was transferred by way of indorsement and delivery of a bill of lading, the judiciary ... had difficulty
construing this as anything other than the transference of complete ownership....
To distinguish between the use of the bill of lading as a security instrument
and as a trading device . . . compelled judges . . .to readjust their modes of
thought to meet the demands of the] . . .new economic order. For most of
them, the process was as slow as it was painful.
This view of the relationship of the judges to the current practice of business
shows the influence of the ideas powerfully expressed in Llewellyn, Across Sales on
Horseback, 52 HAnv. L. REv. 725 (1939) and elsewhere. Compare McLaughlin,
The Evolution of the Ocean Bill of Lading, 35 YALE L.J. 548, 549 (1926): "The
\development of the bill of lading is a pretty example ... of the manner in which
the law, cumbersome and unplastic as it is, eventually bends and gives ground to
keep pace with the developments of commerce.... " See also Negus, The Negotiability of Bills of Lading, 37 L.Q. RE . 442, 452-55 (1921).
43. 1 Raym. Ld. 272, 91 Eng. Rep. 1078 (K.B. 1697); the name of the case is
given in Lord Raymond as Evans v. Marlett but the parallel reports say Evans v.
Martell which seems more likely.
44. Id. at 272, 91 Eng. Rep. at 1078. The parallel reports, cited in note 45 infra,
omit this sentence.
45. See the parallel reports of Evans v. Martell, 3 Salk. 290, 91 Eng. Rep. 831;
12 Mod. 156, 88 Eng. Rep. 1231 (K.B. 1697).
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"consignment in a bill of loading gives the property." If the bill had
stated, "deliver to A for B's account," then B must bring the action.
Here, however, plaintiff had an "ownership to maintain an action."46
From this case, we can conclude that in 1697 the bill of lading had
a legal significance superior to an invoice, that the consignee named
in a bill of lading had "property," and that this "property" could be
transferred. But what does "property" mean in this context? Surely
it does not mean "tide" (abstract, absolute ownership), since concededly the consignee did not "own" the goods but was merely a
factor. The report itself gives the answer: property is "ownership to
maintain an action." 47
This narrow definition accords well with other contemporary uses
of the word; however, taking "property" in its modem sense makes
nonsense of much of the commercial law of the eighteenth century.
"Property" can of course mean legal title or absolute ownership; but
it may mean (especially when unaccompanied by a qualifying adjective) nothing more than a right in chattels sufficient to pursue a
particularremedy (or to have a particularremedy pursued against
one).48 This was certainly true at the beginning of the eighteenth
century, 49 and it continued to hold true during most of that period.

Thus, in the well-known case of Armory v. Delamire,50 a chimney

sweep's boy found a jewel and gave it to a goldsmith's apprentice
to be weighed. The apprentice refused to return the jewel, and the
boy brought an action in trover. The court laid down the rule that
"the finder . . . though he does not . . . acquire an absolute pro46. 12 Mod. 156, 88 Eng. Rep. 1231 (K.B. 1697).
47. See note 46 supra. In Blakey v. Dinsdale, 2 Cowp. 661, 664, 98 Eng. Rep.
1294, 1296 (K.B. 1777), Lord Mansfield remarked: "No doubt but this corn was
the plaintiff's property. He might have brought an action for it against the vendor;
for the bargain was completely bound by the earnest."
48. In Hore v. Milner, Peake 58n., 170 Eng. Rep. 78n. (K.B. 1797), defendant
agreed to buy potatoes but never took delivery. The seller resold. Lord Kenyon
thought that by so doing plaintiff had lost the right to sue for goods bargained and
sold since he had "abandoned his right to insist on the defendant taking the goods,
.he had not considered them as the property of the defendant ....
Id. at 59, 170
Eng. Rep. at 78. If "property" meant "title," how could the plaintiff's action affect
it? See also Hankey v. Smith, Peake 57n., 170 Eng. Rep. 77n. (K.B. 1796); Adams
v. Broughton, 2 Str. 1078, 93 Eng. Rep. 1043 (K.B. 1743).
49. Knight v. Hopper, Holt K.B. 8, 90 Eng. Rep. 902, Skin. 647, 90 Eng. Rep.
290 (K.B. 1697), is deceptive unless "property" is taken in this sense. Muslin was
sold, to be "fetched away" piecemeal, and "paid for as taken away." This meant,
according to Holt, that "the pieces being marked and sealed, the property is altered
immediately, and . . . remained only as a security for the money ....

[I]f they are

not taken away . . . the party may have an action for his money, but may not sell
the goods." Holt K.B. 8, 90 Eng. Rep. 902.
There is a bare possibility that the meaning of "property" we are here describing
reflects a very ancient common-law usage - that of right of action based on possession.
'This is at least hinted at in 2 PorLocK & MArrLAND, H-isToRY OF ENGLIasH LAW 168
(2d ed. 1923); Bordwell, Seisin and Disseisin, 34 HARv. L. REv. 717, 718-19 (1921);
Bordwell, Property in Chattels, 29 HAnv. L. REv. 374 (1915).
50. 1 Str. 505, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722) (coram Pratt, C.J.).

1960]

SALES

perty or ownership, yet he has such a property as will enable him
to keep it against all but the rightful owner, and consequently may
maintain trover." 51 Similarly, the right of a factor in goods over
which the factor has the power of sale is referred to as a 'legal
property."52 And, in 1788, an auctioneer was allowed recovery for
goods sold and delivered, against a buyer who removed goods without paying. 3 The autioneer had a "special property." Yet neither the
chimney sweep's boy, nor the factor, nor the auctioneer, had "title'
in the sense of absolute ownership. In another case, a court remarked that the Statute of Frauds "prevented any property from vesting
in [plaintiff] . . . so as to enable him to maintain trover,"54 a very

peculiar usage of words, unless we understand "property" in a limited, procedural sense. As late as 1796, traces of this usage remained
discernible; Eyre could still remark that "ninety-nine times in an
hundred the indorsement of a bill of lading will be conclusive evidence of the alteration of property without ascribing to it the effect
of a legal instrument as a bill of sale," -5 a distinction strange to
modem minds. In the eighteenth century, property was "altered";
but in the nineteenth century, title "passed." The later expression
makes us think of a single thing which is transferred from one party
to another. The eighteenth century concept makes us think solely of
a change in the total bundle of rights; the change may be complete or
incomplete, just as an "alteration" can be simple or radical.
Now we can return to Holt's dictum in Evans v. Martell that the
consignee of a bill of lading has a "property" which can be assigned. The statement may mean nothing more than that the holder
of the bill has a special right, which may be good for some purposes
but not for others. It might transfer absolute ownership; however, it
need not. In a normal case the transfer of a bill probably gave the right
to demand delivery from the ship's master. But did the transferee's
right take priority over the shipper's right to stop in transit? Clearly,
that was not implicit in the transfer of "property. 5 6 As a matter of
51. Ibid. Trover, in fact, depends on possession; thus a landlord not in possession
cannot bring trover for leased furniture. Gordon v. Harper, 7 T.R. 9, 101 Eng. Rep.
828 (K.B. 1796).
52. See, e.g., Ex parte Emery, 2 Ves. Sen. 674, 28 Eng. Rep. 430 (Ch. 1755); Ex
parte Dumas, 2 Ves. Sen. 582, 585, 28 Eng. Rep. 372, 373 (Ch. 1754).
53. Williams v. Millington, 1 BI. H. 81, 126 Eng. Rep. 49 (C.P. 1788).
54. Alexander v. Comber, 1 Bl. H. 20, 126 Eng. Rep. 13 (C.P. 1788).
55. Haille v. Smith, 1 Bos. & Pul. 563, 570, 126 Eng. Rep. 1066, 1070 (Ex. 1796).
56. Of course it must always be borne in mind that the transferee, in order to
enjoy to the fullest the rights transferred, must be a bona fide taker for value without notice. As the analogy between bills of lading and negotiable instruments grew
in strength, this naturally became more and more explicit. See Wright v. Campbell,
4 Burr. 2046, 98 Eng. Rep. 66, 1 Bl. W. 628, 96 Eng. Rep. 363 (K.B. 1767). In Dick
v. Lumsden, Peake 250, 170 Eng. Rep. 146 (N.P. 1793), Thompson shipped beef
and pork to his factors, Eustace & Holland, in London, to be sold. Thompson had
promised to send along a bill of lading, and did; but the bill was incorrectly en-
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fact, the issue was not clearly settled during the major part of the
eighteenth century. It is easy to assume, as many legal scholars have
done, that by the custom of merchants the bill of lading was more
or less negotiable and that a transfer for value in good faith cut off
the rights of the shipper. 57 Although we have seen evidence that the
endorsement and delivery of a bill of lading transferred rights to the
goods,58 it does not follow that, in merchant custom, these rights
were superior to the rights of an unpaid shipper. For one thing, such
a "custom" would have conflicted with the right of stoppage in
transit, which was certainly part of the psychological expectation of
merchants, whether or not they could have formulated it as "law."
Was the full negotiability of bills of lading greatly desired by merchants? The answer must be yes, if we consider only those merchants
who customarily advanced money on the security of bills of lading.
But the foreign houses who shipped the goods, unless they were
saints in disguise, would have felt differently about the matter.
These "foreign houses" might actually have been English merchants
living abroad, who acted as agents for domestic houses, and advanced their own money in the purchase of imported goods. 59 Furthermore, we must not assume that business practice is necessarily
a finer-grained substance than law, that it is, by some weird chance,
firm, immutable, and infinitely understandable.
On the contrary, both the case law and the evidence we can glean
from the cases as to business usage, hint strongly that the transferee
of a bill of lading was not thought to have rights superior to an unpaid vendor whose consignee became insolvent. To be sure, the
case law was somewhat scanty in the beginning of the century, and
consequently difficult to assess. The controversy turns on the meaning, first of all, of Snee v. Prescot.0
dorsed. The factors returned the bill for proper execution. Thompson endorsed to
the plaintiff, who was not a bona fide purchaser. Meanwhile, the factors sold the
goods to third parties in good faith, who succeeded in getting delivery. Plaintiff
brought an action against the master but lost. Here a bona fide purchaser, even
without possession of the bill of lading, bested a non-bona fide taker of the bill.
See also Salomons v. Nissen, 2 T.R. 674, 100 Eng. Rep. 363 (K.B. 1788), and the
discussion of Savignac v. Cuff therein. Id. at 678, 100 Eng. Rep. at 365.
57. This seems to be Miller's viewpoint. Miller, supra note 42, at 267.
58. Evans v. Martell, 3 Salk 290, 91 Eng. Rep. 831, 12 Mod. 156, 88 Eng. Rep.
1231 (K.B. 1697). See the argument of counsel in Snee v. Prescot, 1 Atk. 245,
247, 26 Eng. Rep. 157, 159 (Oh. 1743).
59. Another possibility is that the two houses might act mutually for each other's
account, shipping goods on open credit. During the eighteenth century, these relationships between merchants were apt to be quite fluid. See note 84 infra.
60. 1 Atk. 245, 26 Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch. 1743). The discussion in Miller, supra note
42, at 268-69, is illuminating, but somewhat vitiated by nineteenth-century hindsight.
Miller seems anxious to explain the case away, as in fact Buller later did. The same
attitude is reflected in 12 HorrswosTm, A IIsToRY oF ENcLIsH LAw 282, 492
(1938). Buller, arguing before the House of Lords in Lickbarrow v. Mason, 6 East
20n., 102 Eng. Rep. 1191 (H.L. 1793), also stated that Snee v. Prescot, 1 Atk. 245,
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In the Snee case, silks were shipped to England from an Italian
port. The bill of lading was made out to the shipper's order. The
shipper endorsed one bill of lading in blank and sent it forward to
his consignee. The consignee assigned
the document to a third
person, as security for advances. 6 1 The consignee failed before payment, and the consignor forwarded another bill of lading to an agent
who managed to get delivery of the goods. The plaintiffs, transferees
of the bill of lading from the consignee (and also the assignees in
bankruptcy), claimed the goods. Lord Chancellor Hardwicke held
for the defendant, since "while goods remain in the hands of the
original proprietor, I see no reason why he should not be said to
have a lien upon them til he is paid. .. *"2 This was so despite any
argument that might be made about the "property" in the goods,
and despite any question of risk of loss.0 3 In short, Snee v. Prescot
is a strong holding to the effect that the right of stoppage in transitu
is powerful enough to override any "property" in the goods which
is transferred by the scratch of a pen and the delivery of a bill of
lading.
If this seems strange, it is well to remind ourselves of what an
eighteenth-century bill of lading looked like. First of all it was,
not one document, but a set of documents. Normally, three bills of
lading were issued, 4 although occasionally the cases mention sets
26 Eng. Rep. 151 (Ch. 1743), was "miserably reported," and that his own view of
the case was based upon "a MS. note taken, as I collect, by Mr. John Cox, who was
counsel. . ." 6 East at 29n., 102 Eng. Rep. at 119n. However, Buller's comment
must be taken with a grain of salt. Law reporting was often primitive in the eighteenth century; but if Snee v. Prescot is "miserably reported," then the same must
be true of a whole line of cases; and by some enormous coincidence, the misery is
all one way. Buller's comment can be fairly safely dismissed as purely tactical. It is
sounder to bear in mind Lord Campbell's statement, apropos of this very period, in
3 CAmPBL., LIvEs oF = Loiw CaNrcEmions 117n. (5th ed., 1868): "MS. notes
were much quoted; and counsel depended on recollection -which had this advantage, that it always made the case recollected, and the case at bar on all fours."
61. Consignor and consignee were partners, but the goods were ordered on account of the consignee alone. Consignor advanced the purchase price. The parties
could therefore be treated as, in effect, buyer and seller, which the court did.
62. 1 Atk. at 249, 26 Eng. Rep. at 160.
63. It has been objected, that in case of any loss or accident to the goods, it was
[the consignee's] . . . risque only. But suppose any damage had happened to
these goods during the voyage, and in transitu, there had been an alteration of
the consignment, the loss clearly must have been home by the consignor.
Id. at 249-50, 26 Eng. Rep. at 160. See note 68 infra for an explanation of Hardwicke's rather odd reasoning.
64. In Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T.R. 63, 72, 100 Eng. Rep. 35, 40 (K.B. 1787).
Miller, supra note 42, at 268, Buller overlooked this fact when he said that in Snee
v. Prescot, 1 Atk. 245, 26 Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch. 1743), the consignor's agent "presented a copy of the bill of lading." No such thing existed; the bills were triplicate
originals. Possibly the word "copy" may have appeared on two of the three, but this
did not make the other bills any less "original," since if the original were lost the
"copy" would become, not evidence of a bill of lading, but the bill itself. The
sources seem clear that the master could discharge his obligation by delivering
against any of the three bills.
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of four 65 or even more.66 And each bill of lading in a set was identical. The typical bill was a printed document, with blank spaces for
the variable information. It stated on its face how many bills were
in the set and that "the one of which . ..bills being accomplish'd," the others would "stand void."67 However, this did not
mean that one of the bills was the original. Of the three usually
issued, the master of the ship kept one, the shipper two. One of the
latter two was forwarded to the consignee; the third was retained.
Originally, the issuing of bills of lading in sets probably rested on
the simple fact that a bill of lading was just as easily lost at sea
as a cargo. Nonetheless, if bills were issued to the shipper's order,
it was obviously possible for a shipper whose consignee had failed,
to endorse his retained bill to an agent in the port of destination,
and for that agent to present the bill to the master when the ship
docked. The master had no way of knowing which bill to honor;
therefore, he would simply release the goods against the first bill
presented to him. Then, one of the bills having been "accomplished,"
the others now "stood void." Therefore, the retained bill gave the
consignor a powerful weapon to control goods in transit. It is this
business practice which was recognized in Snee v. Prescot. What
the case really decided, therefore, is simply that nothing in the law
barred this business usage; if the consignor was unpaid, and if his
consignee failed, the retained bill of lading could be used to procure
delivery of the goods. The device was applicable only to a shipper's
order bill of lading (or a bill of lading in blank); 6 a consignee's
order bill could not in any event be presented by the shipper (or his
65. In Lickbarrow v. Mason, supra note 64, four bills of lading were signed, instead of the usual three. Normally the master kept one bill, and the consignor kept
one and sent one forward. In Lickbarrow, the consignor kept two. A set of four
bills was also mentioned in Curling v. Long, 1 Bos. & Pul. 634, 126 Eng. Rep. 1104
(K.B. 1797).
66. A set of five bills was involved in Slubey & Smith v. Heyward, 2 Bl. H. 504,

126 Eng. Rep. 672 (C.P. 1795).

67. See WmSON, ANGLo-DUTc Com2mRCE AND FiNAxcE 3xr THE 18rH CENTUrY
45 (1941), for an excellent reproduction of a mid-eighteenth-century bill of lading.
The bill is in English, and covers goods shipped from Plymouth to Hamburg. The
date is August 22, 1745-only two years after Snee v. Prescot, 1 Atk. 245, 26 Eng.
Rep. 157 (Ch. 1743). The closing portion of the document reads as follows (written,
as contrasted with printed, matter is italicized) :
In witness whereof the Master or Purser of the said Ship hath affirm'd to
three Bills of Lading, all of this Tenor and Date; the one of which three Bills
being accomplish'd, the other two to stand void. And so God send the good
Ship to her desir'd Port in safety. ....
"Accomplished" of course must have referred to actual delivery of the cargo.
68. In the course of argument before the House of Lords in Lickbarrow v. Mason
6 East 20n., 102 Eng. Rep. 1191 (H.L. 1793), Buller criticized Hardwicke for distinguishing between endorsement in blank and "one that was filled up." Id. at 20n.,
102 Eng. Rep. at 1191. Hardwicke, indeed, does make some such distinction. And in
Brown v. Heathcote, 1 Atk. 160, 162, 26 Eng. Rep. 103, 105 (Ch. 1746), it appeared again: "Even if there had been an indorsement of the bills of lading, it is
not actual assignment, unless the goods were directed to be delivered to the as-

1960]

SALES

agent) for delivery, since his endorsement had no power to transfer
the bill. All of the key eighteenth-century bill of lading cases involve
shippers order bills of lading. Therefore, we can assume that an
unpaid vendor or factor would always ship under a bill of lading
to his own order or in blank, so that he could retain a security in
the goods.
Bills of lading in sets are still issued in international trade today,69
although the Uniform Bills of Lading Act forbids the practice in the
United States.7" However, this prohibition would have been futile
in the innocent age before the invention of carbon paper. In the
days of Snee v. Prescot, where several bills of lading- all representing the same goods and all formally identical-were afloat at
one and the same time, it would have been strange indeed, or even
meaningless, to hold that the bill of lading was negotiable completely, and transferred the property. That kind of reasoning came
later. Snee v. Prescot merely asked the question, as between the two
claimants, who had the better right to the goods? And the answer
was: the first holder of a bill of lading to get real delivery.7 1
Other mid-eighteenth-century cases confirm the impression received from Snee v. Prescot. In Fearonv. Bowers, 2 twenty butts of
olive oil were shipped by Askell, at Malaga, to Hall, at Salisbury.
signee." Lord Mansfield himself, we are told, in the unreported case of Savignac v.
Cuff (cited in Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T.R. 63, 66, 100 Eng. Rep. 35, 37 (K.B.
1787) was inclined to distinguish between "bills of lading endorsed in blank and
otherwise; but he afterwards abandoned that ground." There must therefore have
been some sense to the distinction; a "filled up bill" must refer either to a buyer's
order bill, or more likely, to a bill so endorsed as to relinquish the consignor's control, by requiring the endorsement of the consignee. See Buller's own opinion in
Caldwell v. Ball, 1 T.R. 205, 99 Eng. Rep. 1053 (K.B. 1786). The Caldwell case
involved a dispute between the endorsees of bills number one and two. Buller held
that the first endorsee had the superior right to the goods, since a shipper armed with
a shipper's order bill has "the absolute control over the goods; and might have unshipped them if he had so pleased. So that they are not like goods consigned to a
third person ...
" Id. at 217, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1060. Even though Buller felt that
the first endorsement and delivery passed the "property," and that there was nothing
left for the second endorsee to take; still, there is a hidden inconsistency in the
passage quoted. Is it the consignment that consigns or the delivery of the bill of
lading? Hardwicke's very logical answer would have been that the consignment consigns, subject to the shipper's right of control. This explains the odd passage quoted
in note 63 supra. Risk of loss shifts if the consignment is altered, because this has
the same effect as use of the retained bill. Control is the important concept.
69. 2 WmnLsvoN, SArs § 441 (rev. ed. 1948).
70. UNwOHM Brr.rs ov LADin mAcr § 6.
71. For example, in D'Aquila v. Lambert, Aab. 399, 27 Eng. Rep. 266, 2 Eden
75, 28 Eng. Rep. 824 (Ch. 1761), no mention was made of a bill of lading. But the
report in 2 Eden tells us that goods were shipped September 21, 1759, and consigned to Israeli from Leghorn. On November 16, Israeli stopped payment. Plaintiff
then "revoked the consignment" and "consigned the goods to his factor." This probably was accomplished by endorsing the retained bill of lading and sending it to the
factor, with instructions. In other words, there are more "bill of lading" cases than
meet the eye; they hide in the reports under other disguises.
72. 1 BL H. 365, 126 Eng. Rep. 214 (C.P. 1753).
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Three shipper's order bills of lading were signed, with the "usual
clause, that one being performed, the other two should be void." 7
Askell sent one bill to the consignee, and another to his agent in
England. Both bills had been properly endorsed. Defendant, the
ship's captain, delivered the goods to Askell's English agent. The
goods had not been paid for. The statement of the case then continues as follows.Merchants were examined on both sides, and seemed to agree that the
indorsement of a bill of lading vests the property; but that the original
consignor if not paid . ..had a right by any means that he could to
stop their coming to the hands of the consignee. ... It also appeared by
the evidence of merchants and captains of ships, that the usage was, where
three bills of lading were signed by the captain, and indorsed to different
persons, the captain had a right to deliver the goods to whichever he
thought proper ...
Lee, Ch. J., . . . said, that, to be sure, nakedly considered, a bill of
lading transfers the property, and a right to assign that property by indorsement. .

.

. But . . . [the shipper] had the other bill of lading to

be as a curb on Hall [the consignee] who in fact had never paid ....
And . . . according to the usage of trade, the captain was not concerned

to examine who had the best right. ... All he had to do was to deliver
. . . upon one of the bills of lading. .... 74

Of course, Fearon v. Bowers is an action against the captain for

wrongful delivery, but the description of the retained bill as a
curb" seems perfectly reasonable. Looking backward, we may
probably conclude that we do not have two lines of cases - "stoppage in transit" cases and "transfer of bill of lading" cases -but one
line only, in which the mechanism of stoppage was the presentation
of the shipper's retained bill, generally endorsed by him to his representative at the ultimate port of call. 75 The first stage of development
was the simple "free-for-all" doctrine; the first to get the goods by
presenting a bill of lading was allowed to keep them, or, at any rate,
that any proper delivery absolved at least the shipper.76 Later, a

simple demand, accompanied by the showing of a bill of lading,
was enough to preserve the consignor's right to stoppage in a proper
case. 77 This was later followed, even in domestic sales without bills
of lading, by the development of what we might call an absolute
73. Ibid. See also quote at note 67 supra.
74. Id. at 365, 126 Eng. Rep. at 214-15. (Emphasis added.)
75. See note 71 supra.
76. This was Lee's view, apparently, in Fearon v. Bowers, 1 Bl. H. 365, 126
Eng. Rep. 214 (C.P. 1753). Cf. Wiseman v. Vandeputt, 2 Vern. 203, 23 Eng. Rep.
732 (Ch. 1690) and Snee v. Prescot, 1 Atk. 245, 26 Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch. 1743).
As late as Walley v. Montgomery, 3 East 585, 102 Eng. Rep. 721 (K.B. 1803), the
first-come-first-serve idea retained enough vitality to be cited in argument (although
unsuccessfully) by counsel.
77. See Wright v. Campbell, 4 Burr. 2046, 98 Eng. Rep. 66, 1 BI. W. 628, 96
Eng. Rep. 363 (K.B. 1767). This case shows the existence of a practice which may
partially explain the change in the law. The ship's master asked for (and got) an
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78 We shall return to the
right of stoppage when a consignee7 failed.
9
pages.
coming
in
later development
There seems little doubt, therefore, that shipping merchants were
in the habit of using their retained bills as security devices. If their
consignee failed, they could invoke their right of stoppage by
presenting the bill themselves, or by endorsing it and sending it on
to someone at the port of destination who could intercept the ship
at the wharves. A bill of lading might also be endorsed and transferred for a number of other purposes. For example, the retained
bill might be negotiated to a resident of London, to be used to
"effect an insurance" with one of the London companies8 0 The
versatility of the bill of lading is well exemplified by Wright v.
Campbell, decided by Lord Mansfield. 81 The case also sheds light
on Mansfield's view of the legal effect of a bill of lading. Mansfield's
opinion is of unusual interest, since he of all people must be expected to have been sensitive to the custom of merchants. Yet the
case hints strongly that he did not believe that bills of lading were
negotiable, at least not in the same sense as bills of exchange. The
facts were these: F, a London merchant, shipped wheat and beans
to Liverpool, under a shipper's order bill of lading. He endorsed one
bill to the order of Swanwick, his factor. Swanwick endorsed to
Scott, apparently without mention that he was a factor, but giving
the impression that he owned and had paid for the goods. F arrived
in London and demanded that Scott relinquish any claim he might
have in the goods. When Scott refused, F endorsed the retained bill
to the defendant. Both Scott and Swanwick failed; plaintiffs were
Scott's assignees. The goods arrived and were delivered to the
defendant, who indemnified the captain. Lord Mansfield favored
the plaintiffs; but a new trial was ordered to ascertain the facts,
since the transaction between Swanwick and Scott smacked heavily
of fraud. In the course of his opinion, Mansfield stated:

This is clear, that if there is an authority never so general, by indorsement upon a bill of lading, without disclosing that the indorsee is factor, the
owner (as between him and the factor) retains a lien, till delivery of the
goods, and before they are actually sold and turned into money ....
But if the goods are bona fide sold by the factor at sea (as they may be,
indemnity before delivering the disputed goods. If such a practice were widespread, it
would eliminate the necessity for a rule protecting the shipping interests.
78. See Lovat v. Parsons, 1 Cowp. 61, 98 Eng. Rep. 967 (K.B. 1774) (right of
stoppage in transit not defeated by bribery of the carrier to turn over the goods).
Such a holding, of course, is technically inconsistent with the free-for-all theory. Id.
at 62, 98 Eng. Rep. at 968.
79. See note 139 infra and accompanying text.
80. See Godin v. London Assur. Co., 1 Bl. W. 103, 96 Eng. Rep. 58 (K.B. 1758).
On marine insurance, see the informative treatment in SumanLAND, A LONDON
MER HANT, 1692-1744 42-80 (1933). Of course, the classic contemporary treatment
of the law of marine insurance is PA.K, MAwmn INsuAN cEs (1842).
81. 4 Burr. 2046, 98 Eng. Rep. 66, 1 BI. W. 628, 96 Eng. Rep. 368 (K.B. 1767).
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where no other delivery can be given) it will be good. .

.

. [T]he vendee

shall hold them by virtue of the bill of sale, though no actual possession
is delivered; and the owner can never dispute with the vendee; 8because
2
the goods were sold bona fide and by the owner's own authority.

This statement seems to imply that the bona fide purchaser is protected, in Mansfield's view, not by any magic in the transfer of the
bill of lading, but because of the commercial and moral claims of a
bona fide purchaser from a factor. It is the authority given to the
factor, and not the bill of lading, which does the trick. The owner,
we would now say, is estopped from denying the factor's power
to pass clear ownership. The vendee would hold the goods by virtue
of a "bill of sale." Under this kind of reasoning, there is neither
need for nor logic in holding a bill of lading negotiable. The other
judges were even clearer on
this point: a bill of lading has not the
8 3
effect of a bill of exchange.

Nonetheless, the case is something of a turning-point in the law.
Mansfield's reasoning was not restricted to bills of lading, but was
peculiarly applicable to them, since overseas shipments to factors
invariably used bills, and the practice required their negotiation.
It would have been only a short step forward to hold that the

endorsement and delivery of a bill of lading per se vests the endorsee with apparent authority to negotiate the bill to a third party

and cut off the original shipper's equity. At this stage, for all practical purposes, negotiability has been attained. Mansfield, of course,
speaks only of "factors." But there was no clear-cut line, in the
eighteenth century, between a "factor" and a "buyer."8 4 Merchants

in different ports often acted as factors for each other; and the "factor's" role often included advancing money to the "principal" for
goods. Merchants dealt, now on their own account, now for the
account of others. The rule for "factors" was thus capable of spread82. Id. at 2050-51, 98 Eng. Rep. at 69. Concerning the history of the estoppel
notion, revived in the nineteenth century, see J. W. JoNFs, THE PosrrlON AND RiGHTS
OF A BoxA FinE PucnAsER FOR VALUE OF GooDs IMnRoPERLY OBTAnED 50-54
(1921). The estoppel idea, though not so called, is discernible in some cases involving factors who pass off goods as their own. See, e.g., George v. Claggett, 7
T.R. 859, 101 Eng. Rep. 1019 (K.B. 1797); Scrimshire v. Alderton, 2 Str. 1182,
93 Eng. Rep. 1114 (K.B. 1760).
83. Wright v. Campbell, 1 Bl. W. 628, 629, 96 Eng. Rep. 363, 364.
84. It has been contended that the right of stopping in transitu does not
attach between these parties. . . . If that were so, it would nearly put an end to
the application of that law in this country; for I believe it happens for the
most part that orders come to the merchants here from their correspondents
abroad to purchase and ship certain merchandise to them; the merchants here,
upon the authority of those orders, obtain the goods from those whom they deal
with; and they charge a commission to their correspondents abroad upon the
price of the commodity thus obtained. It never was doubted but that the merchant here, if he heard of the failure of his correspondent abroad, might stop
the goods in transitu.
Feise v. Wray, 3 East 93, 101, 102 Eng. Rep. 532, 535 (K.B. 1802) (Lawrence, J.).
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ing to cover all merchants. Another point worth mentioning is
Mansfield's statement about "delivery." By stressing the fact that
a documentary transfer is the best that can be had under the circumstances, Mansfield was giving the transfer of a bill of lading
some of the legitimacy of the common-law formal "sale." For all
these reasons, later courts could well point to Wright v. Campbell
in support of a rule contrary to Snee v. Prescot. But because these
destructive tendencies were fairly subtle, and possibly because of
commercial practice, the doctrine of Snee v. Prescot seems to have
retained some of its force until nearly the end of the century.
The decisive blow to the doctrine of Snee v. Prescot was administered by the great case of Lickbarrow v. Mason. 5 This famous
controversy dragged itself out in the courts for over six years; and
it ended, apparently, in the overthrow of the rule of Snee v. Prescot. More narrowly stated, Lickbarrow v. Mason succeeded in reversing the older view that the right of stoppage in transit was even
superior to the rights of a bona fide transferee of a bill of lading.
Partly, Lickbarrow v. Mason represents a real shift in legal direction. But a good deal of its meaning lies in the fact that here most
clearly the shift in the meaning of the concept of property was
made apparent: the transfer of property to the buyer of a bill of
lading became absolute, that is, a virtual transfer of "title."
The facts of the case are somewhat involved, but briefly stated,
the dispute was as follows: a cargo of grain was shipped from
Holland to Liverpool by T, for the account of F, a firm of merchants
at Rotterdam. Four bills of lading were executed. T endorsed two
of them in blank and sent them to F; F forwarded the bills of
lading to plaintiff, a Liverpool merchant, to be sold for F's account.
F drew on plaintiff for the price, which was duly paid. F, who had
never paid T, the consignor, failed. T then endorsed the retained
fourth bil to the defendants, who succeeded in procuring delivery
of the goods. Thus, a fairly clear-cut test of the validity of Snee v.
Prescot as a precedent was placed before the court. 6
85. The chief opinions of this case are found in 2 T.R. 63, 100 Eng. Rep. 35
(K.B. 1787); 1 Bl H. 357, 126 Eng. Rep. 209 (Ex. 1790); 5 T.R. 683, 101 Eng.
Rep. 380 (K.B. 1794). Buller's argument before the House of Lords is reported at
6 East 20n., 102 Eng. Rep. 1191 (H.L. 1793). See also 4 Bro. P.C. 57, 2 Eng. Rep.
39 (H.L. 1793). Thus the litigation was quite protracted. Miller, supra note 42, at
269-72, is very valuable; but it is colored somewhat by the nineteenth-century interpretation of the case, which stressed Buller's opinion exclusively, ignored all the
others, and took Buller's view of previous decisions at face value.
86. Miller, supra note 42, at 271, emphasizes the fact that the relationship between
F and the plaintiff was "not that of seller and buyer, but that of consignor and consignee." Miller feels that this fact was glossed over by Buller because of Buller's idea
that the bill of lading transferred "property." Since the bill of lading was silent concerning the relationship between F and the plaintiff, the relationship was irrelevant.
This is true enough, and Buller's analysis finds some sup-port in Wright v. Campbell,
4 Burr. 2046, 98 Eng. Rep. 66 (K.B. 1767). But plaintiff, as Buller himself points
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In King's Bench, sparked by a powerful opinion of Justice Buller,
plaintiff was victorious.87 Snee v. Prescot was distinguished and
criticized; the endorsement and delivery of a bill of lading to a
bona fide purchaser was ruled to transfer the "property," so as
to blot out the right of stoppage in transit. In the Exchequer Chamber, the decision was reversed. 88 The House of Lords sent the case
back for a new trial; but it is not clear whether the effect of this
action was to approve of Buller's view of the law or not; apparently
even contemporary opinion was in some doubt.8 9 On re-trial, King's
Bench simply reaffirmed its previous opinion, propped up this time
by a jury finding as to the "custom of merchants."90 No appeal
seems to have been taken from this decision; perhaps the litigants,
less interested in making legal history than in saving money, settled
the case. It can be argued, therefore, that Lickbarrow v. Mason
really settled nothing. As a matter of fact, however, Buller's powerfiul opinion exerted an enormous influence on later judges and
courts.
Exactly what was it that Buller meant to decide? He did not, for
example, take up Mansfield's opening, and defeat the consignor on
an "apparent authority" theory; Justice Ashhurst, his colleague on
the bench, made more of this. 9 Nor can it really be argued that Buller did no more than accommo 4 ate the law to business usage; 92
out, is a financing factor, not a "pure" factor; he is out money just as surely as if
he had been a buyer, not to mention the fact that as a factor he has a lien for his
general balance. All the judges concurred in treating plaintiff as substantially in the
position of a buyer. See note 84 supra.
Possibly in this respect, Buller's view represented a change in direction since Godfrey v. Furzo, 3 P. Wins. 185, 24 Eng. Rep. 1022 (Ch. 1733). In Godfrey, Lord
Chancellor King apparently differentiated between a financing factor and a buyerthe factor did not get "property." Buller distinguishes the case by pretending that
Godfrey involved a "pure" factor, that is, a factor who has not made advances to
his principal. This is simply not true, as Buller must have known. Still, Buller must
be allowed the privilege, fundamental to judges, of ignoring troublesome precedents.
87. Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T.R. 63, 100 Eng. Rep. 35 (K.B. 1787).
88. Mason v. Lickbarrow, 1 Bl. H. 357, 126 Eng. Rep. 209 (Ex. 1790).
89. The report in 4 Bro. P.C. 57, 2 Eng. Rep. 39 (H.L. 1793) gives the distinct
impression that Buller's view was found persuasive in the House of Lords. But this
contrasts with the neutral tone of the briefer note in 5 T.R. 867, 101 Eng. Rep. 206
(H.L. 1793). And the occasional citations of Lord Loughborough's opinion in Exchequer Chamber suggest that contemporary lawyers were not entirely sure how to
read the oracle of their highest court. See note 117 infra.
90. Lickbarrow v. Mason, 5 T.R. 683, 101 Eng. Rep. 380 (K.B. 1794).
91. 2 T.R. at 70, 100 Eng. Rep. at 39.
92. Justice Ashhurst, concurring with Buller in King's Bench, was emphatic on
this point: The "rule is founded purely on principles of law, and not on the custom
of merchants. The custom of merchants only establishes that such an instrument may
be indorsed; but the effect of that indorsement is a question of law...
" Id. at 71,
100 Eng. Rep. at 39. It is hard not to agree with Ashhurst: how can there be said to
be a "custom" as to what the law is? The most that can be said is that the decision in
King's Bench accords with what merchants expect and like, which is not the same
thing at all.
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we have seen that the business usage was at least ambiguous, if
not positively inimical to Buller's point of view. It is true, Buller
deliberately set about to clarify the law; he intended to make the
law aid business usage, which is not the same thing as conforming
the law to such usage. What was needed was, in his view, a set
of general principles which could "serve as a guide for the future."
The important question, as Buller saw it, was "whether a bill of
lading is by law a transfer of the property." 93 Now this was a strange
way to isolate the issue. Clearly a bill of lading did transfer some
property rights; no one disputed that fact. Furthermore, Buller
himself stated that there was another possible basis for his holding- a basis upon which he declined to rest. This was the fact
that four bills of lading were issued, instead of the usual three.
Plaintiff, on getting two of them, could not, according to Buller,
imagine that the consignor had it in his power to order a delivery
to any other person." 9 This was a weak argument, and Buller did
well to pass lightly over it.95 Even more damaging would have been
the consequences of such an argument: if two bills would lull the
plaintiff into a false security, then it would follow that one bill
would put him (and any transferee of the bill) on notice that a
bill of lading was outstanding which might be used as a "curb."
But this was precisely the line of logic which Buller was at pains
to avoid. Concededly, no transferee of a bill of lading took rights
superior to an unpaid vendor, if the transferee did not pay value
without notice of any infirmities. But against the background of the
current practice at that time, the bona fides of buyers and financiers
of cargo against bills of lading obviously would not bear too close
a look, since, technically, they had (or should have had) notice
of the retained bill. Here was a potential trap; and Buller himself, in Salomons v. Nissen,"6 nearly fell through, only one year after
his first opinion in King's Bench.
Admittedly, the law prior to Lickbarrow v. Mason was not per93. Id. at 73, 100 Eng. Rep. at 40.
94. Id. at 72, 100 Eng. Rep. at 40.
95. The bill, as Buller admitted, must have clearly stated on its face that four
were outstanding. This was the practice. Buller theorized that the endorsee might
not have read the bill. But an eighteenth-century bill of lading was only a few lines
long and could have been read by any literate person in a few seconds. Furthermore,
though bills were generally issued in sets of three, sets of four were by no means unknown. See Curling v. Long, 1 Bos. & Pl. 634, 126 Eng. Rep. 1104 (K.B. 1797).
In Slubey & Smith v. Heyward, 2 B1. H. 504, 126 Eng. Rep. 672 (C.P. 1795), five
were involved.
96. 2 T.R. 674, 100 Eng. Rep. 63 (K.B. 1788). One bill was turned over to the
plaintiff, who paid with acceptances. Snee v. Prescot, 1 Atk. 245, 26 Eng. Rep. 157
(Ch. 1743), was resurrected by the court to protect the vendor, on a showing that
plaintiff knew the goods were not paid for. But plaintiff had entered into an explicit agreement with the vendee which allowed Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T.R. 63,
100 Eng. Rep. 35 (K.B. 1787), to be distinguished. The day was saved by Cuming
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fect. The buyer of a bill of lading could not be sure of his position.
The free-for-all aspects of the doctrine of Snee v. Prescot, although
in decline, were inimical to Buller's grand plan for "general principles." 97 Perhaps they were inimical as well to the stability of
commerce. At least Buller felt so. But in casting about for conceptual help, Buller discarded the slip-shod equitable notions of the
law merchant (and equity) and found his solution in the kind of
tight logic characteristic of the old common law. He held that the
right of the transferee was a legal, not a customary, right; it was
property. Thus, before the House of Lords, arguing in behalf of
his King's Bench opinion, Buller cited ancient maxims-bits and
snatches from the attic of the common law- to the effect that
delivery was not necessary to pass "property," and the like.98 He
had, however, shifted ground. The "property" of which he was
speaking might not yet have been as rigid as the nineteenth-century "title" was supposed to be, but it was certainly a stiffer cloth
than we saw in Evans v. Martell. It was, in fact, stiff enough so
that the right of stoppage in transit must yield to it. Here, unfortunately, Buller had proved too much. Carried to its logical extreme,
the argument based on "property" would deny the right of stoppage
in transit altogether, that is, even as between vendor and vendee,
since if the bill of lading gave "property," it gave it all along the
line.99 To save himself, Buller resorted to the common law. Seizing upon some stray dicta, he equated the right of stoppage in
transit with the venerable common-law lien: 1°°
Neither of them are founded on property; but they necessarily suppose
v. Brown, 9 East 506, 516, 103 Eng. Rep. 666, 670 (K.B. 1808), where Lord Ellenborough distinguished Salomons v. Nissen, supra, as Miller apty puts it, "out of existence," by explaining that "without notice" did not mean ''without notice that
the goods had not been paid for,' but, 'without notice of such circumstances as rendered the bill of lading not fairly and honestly assignable."' 9 East at 516, 103
Eng. Rep. at 670.
97. "Before," Buller complained, "in Courts of Law all the evidence in mercantile cases was thrown together; they were left generally to a jury, and . .. produced
no established principles. From that time . .. the great study has been to find some
certain general principles, which shall be known to all mankind . .. to serve as a
guide for the future." Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T.R. 63, 73, 100 Eng. Rep. 35,
40 (K.B. 1787).
98. See Buller's argument, discussing Noy's Maxims, Shepherd's Touchstone, and
other authorities of like vintage, before the House of Lords, in Lickbarrow v. Mason,
6 East 20n.(a), 102 Eng. Rep. 1192, 1193 (1793).
99. The inconsistency has been noticed by Miller, supra note 42, at 272. Buller cites
Hunter v. Beal, decided by Lord Mansfield in 1785 (see 3 T.R. 466, 100 Eng. Rep.
680), and remarks that "as between vendor and vendee, the property is not altered
till delivery of the goods." Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T.R. 63, 75, 100 Eng. Rep. 35, 41
(K.B. 1787). But before the House of Lords, Buller argued that the consignee had
"legal property."
100. Mansfield had spoken of the right as a "lien" in Wright v. Campbell, 4 Burr.
2046, 98 Eng. Rep. 66 (K.B. 1767); Vale v. Bayle, 1 Cowp. 295, 98 Eng. Rep. 1094
(K.B. 1775); see also text accompanying note 62 supra (Lord Hardwicke).
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the property to be in some other person, and not in him who sets up
either of these rights. They are qualified rights, which in given cases
may be exercised over the property of another: and it is a contradiction
in terms to say a man has a lien upon his own goods, or a right to stop
his own goods in transitu. If the goods be his, he has a right to the
possession of them . . . as he pleases, without the option of any other
person .... 101

The argument shows a commendable mastery of legal logic; it is

not, however, really applicable, at least when considered historically. The right of stoppage in transit is not, like the lien, a possessory right or, better phrased, a right to retain possession. It is

a right to resume possession. Goods released by a common-law lienholder could not be stopped in the hands of a carrier

02

Further-

more, a common-law lien was a right to hold on to goods; no power

of sale went with it.10 3 But a shipper stopping in transit had abso-

lute control over the subsequent disposition of the goods.
It is interesting to note that even Buller's line of reasoning did

not really go to make a bill of lading negotiable. On the contrary,
if a bill of lading were really negotiable, there would be no need
to equate the right of stoppage with a lien. Negotiable instruments
have the characteristic that equities may be interposed at will between original parties; only bona fide third parties may cut them
off. Thus, there would be no question of the right of the shipper

to stop, as between himself and his consignee.
What Buller had done was to erect a complex, highly technical
card-house of concepts, where before there was relative simplicity,

even naivete. But it was all done in the name of business convenience. Here the hair-splitting comes, not from the common-law

conservatives, trussed up in year-book and precedent, but from
the forward-lookers, the reformers of the law. Buller saw no way
out. Otherwise, no one would be safe in "buying, or in lending
money upon goods at sea." The goods would be "'locked up."
If the goods are in all cases to be liable to the original owner for the
price, what is there to be bought? There is nothing but the chance of
the market. . . . The great advantage which this country possesses over
most if not all other parts of the known world, in point of foreign trade,
consists in the extent of credit given on exports, and the ready advances
made on imports. 04
101. Buller's argument before the House of Lords in Lickbarrow v. Mason, 6 East
20n.(a), 102 Eng. Rep. 1191, 1192 (H.L. 1793).
102. This was later held in the case of a lien-holder who sent goods back to an owner by carrier. Sweet v. Pym, 1 East 4, 102 Eng. Rep. 2 (K.B. 1800); cf. Kruger v.
Wilcox, 1 Arab. 252, 27 Eng. Rep. 168 (Ch. 1755) and Buller's own remarks in the
House of Lords, 6 East 20n.(a), 102 Eng. Rep. 1192. Of course the maritime lien,
which is nonpossessory, is a better analogy.
103. See Jones v. Pearle, 1 Str. 557, 93 Eng. Rep. 698 (K.B. 1737).
104. 6 East 20n., 102 Eng. Rep. 1191 (H.L. 1793). Also, Buller reminded us of the
supposed plight of an importing merchant who was drawn on for the value of the goods.
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For the protection and furtherance of these interests, Buller was
sure the transferee of a bill of lading needed the "property."
The power and persuasiveness of Buller's reasoning in Lickbarrow v. Mason have tended to obscure Lord Loughborough's very
interesting opinion in the Exchequer Chamber.105 Unlike Buller,
Lord Loughborough seems to have held to an older conception of
"property." "Property" to him might have meant a limited right;
more than one person could have property in the same goods at
the same time. This seems clear from his remark that "by the delivery on board, the ship-master acquires a special property to
support that possession which he holds in the right of another, and
to enable him to perform his undertaking. The general property
remains with the shipper of the goods .. .. ,' 06 Loughborough's view
was that the endorsement of a bill of lading was "simply a direction of
the delivery of the goods." 0 7 The endorsee got nothing more than a
"rightto receive the goods and to discharge the ship-master." A bill of
lading was not a negotiable instrument like a bill of exchange; the
form was not standardized, and the information on the face of the bill
often expressed a "false account and risk." '° Mere possession of a bill
of lading could not give title to the goods, any more than mere posHow could he protect himself against loss? He must insure, and unless the bill of
lading gave him "property," Buller argued, he could not. But, as Buller must have
known, this reasoning was fallacious. It is true that the possibility of procuring insurance for someone else's account, an old custom, see Holdsworth, The Early History of
the Contract of Insurance, 17 CoLum. L. Bmv. 85, 96-97 (1917), was curtailed somewhat by the Insurance Act, 1746, 19 Geo. 2, ch. 87, which forbade the procuring of
insurance "Interest or no Interest, or without further Proof or Interest than the Policy,
with certain exceptions. Nevertheless, the importing merchant certainly had a sufficient
insurable interest under eighteenth-century marine insurance law. For examples of the
kind of policy the statute struck down, compare Le Cras v. Hughes, 8 Dougl. 81, 99
Eng. Rep. 549 (K.B. 1782) with Lowry v. Bourdieu, 2 Dougl. 468, 99 Eng. Rep. 299
(K.B. 1780). "Double assurance" was not illegal; and the holder of the bill of lading
was allowed to insure even though the consignor's resident correspondent had already
done so, in Godin v. London Assur. Co., 1 Bl. W. 103, 96 Eng. Rep. 58 (K.B. 1758).
In the second place, under the older view of "property," there was no question that
the endorsee of the bill of lading had "property," no matter how Lickbarrow v. Mason
might have been decided. See note 116 infra.
105. Mason v. Lickbarrow, I Bl. H. 357, 126 Eng. Rep. 209 (C.P. 1790).
106. Id. at 359, 126 Eng. Rep at 211.
107. Note that very often, in the eighteenth century, this was literally true - a
merchant endorsed a bill of lading to his resident agent in the port of destination, not
as a sale or a pledge, but simply to enable the agent to insure the goods, or collect the
goods, or the like.
108. Again, this was literally true. Snee's counsel in Snee v. Prescot argued that "it
is the custom of merchants at Leghorn, to send bills here filled up [so as] . . . to conceal the names of the persons to whom the goods are sent, that the publick may not
know the persons in England, with whom such houses deal, or to whom the property
belongs." Snee v. Prescot, 1 Atk. 245, 246, 26 Eng. Rep. 157, 158 (Ch. 1743). And
as early as Evans v. Martell, 1 Ld. Raym. 271, 91 Eng. Rep. 1078 (K.B. 1697), English
courts had held that a named consignee of the bill of lading had "property" sufficient
to obtain delivery of the goods, even though the invoice showed that the named consignee had no actual ownership rights in the goods.
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session of the goods themselves. 0 9 Just as Buller later (before the
House of Lords) brought in common-law precedents to show that

a sale could be consummated without delivery, so Lord Loughborough used common-law materials to show that delivery, or transfer of possession, was not enough to cut off an original owner's
rights. 110 To divest an owner of his "titlde" (Loughborough uses the
word), some legally sufficient act must take place; none could be
m"' And whatever the
found in the facts of Lickbarrow v. Mason.

juridical doubts, commercial necessity- an oracle which Loughborough read differently from Buller- demanded the protection
of the original owner:
And unless there was a clear established general usage to place the assignment of a bill of lading upon the same footing as the indorsement of
a bill of exchange, that country which should first adopt such a law would
lose its credit with the rest of the commercial world; for the immediate
consequence would be to prefer the interest of the resident factors and
their creditors to the fair claim of the foreign consignor. It would not be
much less pernicious to its internal commerce; for every case of this nature is founded in a breach of confidence, always attended with a
suspicion of collusion, and leads to a dangerous and false credit at the
hazard and expense of the fair trader." 2

And again:
The greater part of the consignments from the West Indies, and all countries where the balance of trade is in favour of England, are made to a
creditor of the shipper; but they are no discharge of the debt by indorsement of the bill of lading; the expense of insurance, freight, duties
are all charged to the shipper, and the net proceeds alone can be applied
to the discharge of his debt.113

Here, however, the force of Loughborough's arguments had been
blurred by the development of commerce, both foreign and domestic, during the century. Even in internal trade, "breach of
109. Here Loughborough cited Hartop v. Hoare, 3 Atk. 44, 26 Eng. Rep. 828 (K.B.
1743). A jewel in a sealed bag was left with a jeweler for safekeeping. The jeweler, a
man of dubious morals, broke open the bag and pawned the jewel, purporting to be the
real owner. Chief Justice Lee, felt that nothing bad occurred to "devest" Hartop of
his ownership rights. The case does not support Loughborough's argument; it simply
begs the question. Is such a case as Lickbarrow to be governed by the rules applicable
to simple bailees in domestic cases? What is interesting, however, is the fact that the
principle of Hartop v. Hoare later (in the nineteenth century) under the "title" system
did expand greatly into the commercial field.
110. Mason v. Lickbarrow, 1 BI. H. 357, 362, 126 Eng. Rep. 209, 212-18 (C.P.
1790).
111. Loughborough did cite, however, Fearon v. Bowers, 1 B. H. 364n.(a), 126
Eng. Rep. 214 (C.P. 1753) and Snee v. Prescot, 1 Atk. 245, 26 Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch.
1743), which were in fact apt precedents.

112. Mason v. Lickbarrow, 1 Bl. H. 357, 361, 126 Eng. Rep. 209, 212 (C.P. 1790).
113. Id. at 368, 126 Eng. Rep. at 216. Loughborough remarked that the "same law,"

that is, the doctrine of Snee v. Prescot, obtained in other countries, mentioning the
ruling of a Dutch court. Id. at 365, 126 Eng. Rep. at 213-14.
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confidence" with a "suspicion of collusion" was not the only danger
present; bankruptcy and the possibility of a "shilling-in-a-pound"
dividend was a more acute peril. We can disregard Loughborough's
arguments in terrorem (and Buller's, too, for that matter); business has a way of thriving, despite legal difficulties, by accommodating itself to the given state of law. Furthermore, Loughborough's
argument is weak, since at the time Lickbarrow v. Mason was litigated, merchants could no longer be neatly classified into two
groups, foreign shippers and English consignees. Trade was carried on between Englishman and Englishman, foreigner and foreigner, Englishman and foreigner. The "foreigner" might be a resident of
London, the Englishman a resident of Brazil. English commercial
colonies were abroad, and colonies of foreigners were settled in the
major English trade-towns; of course, many of them eventually
became naturalized." Likewise, we must recall the spectacular
growth of the English "plantations" in the New World and elsewhere. The line between foreign and domestic trade was bound
to weaken with the Empire's growth. There grew up, during the
century, a vast trade technically between Englishmen only, but with5
the distances, customs, and some of the problems of foreign trade.1
For all that may be said in praise of Loughborough's opinion,
apparently the merchant community and the lawyers were more
impressed by the soundness of Buller's. We may infer from this a
true, if gradual, shift in the psychological expectation of mer114. See CLAPHAm, A CONCISE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF BRTAmN FROM TIuE EAIu.rxsr
Tnms TO 1750 280 (1949).
115. Of course the American Revolution altered the picture somewhat. Throughout
the century, however, the West Indies were generally more highly regarded than the
American states, especially the northern colonies, which produced little besides timber,
that England wanted to import. In 1770, the northern colonies imported from the
mother country ten times as much as they exported. The southern colonies, which grew
tobacco and cotton, attained a more even balance. However, the West Indies exported
far more to England than they imported. Their produce, such as sugar, was needed in
England, while their plantation economies did not absorb English finished goods in
nearly so great an amount. See the table reprinted in BOGART & KEmmEBE, AN
ECONOMu ICIsToRY OF THm AmuCAN PEOPLE 126 (rev. ed. 1942). Many eighteenthcentury commercial cases arose out of the West Indies trade. Jamaican sugar figures in
Caldwell v. Ball, 1 T.R. 205, 99 Eng. Rep. 1053 (K.B. 1786) and Hibbert v. Carter,
1 T.R. 745, 99 Eng. Rep. 1355 (K.B. 1787). In form, of course, the West Indies trade
-and
the Irish trade -was identical with "foreign" trade, that is, trade conducted
overseas, with the use of documents. During the course of the century, the reported
cases show the growing importance of "empire" trade.
For obvious reasons, the eighteenth-century commercial cases dealt almost exclusively with imports. Export cases were rare; they would normally have been litigated in
foreign forums. An exception, however, was such a case as Salomons v. Nissen, 2 T.R.
674, 100 Eng. Rep. 363 (K.B. 1788). Lead, shipped from England to France, never
left its port. Luckily or unluckily, bad weather drove the vessel back to England, the
consignee failed, and the consignor had the goods (by chance) back in his grasp. But
this is rare. Furthermore, in the export trade the transaction was more likely to be fully
consummated before the ship left England. See Miller, Bills of Lading and Factorsin
Nineteenth Century English Overseas Trade, 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 256--57 (1957).
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chants. 116 Apparenly Loughborough's opinion was quickly forgotten," 7 while Buller's was constantly cited, treated as settled law,
and eventually turned into a classic."' And this despite the fact
that technically it is hard to say which court's holding is more
"binding." 119
Although Buller's reasoning, after a decent interval, became accepted law, it raised problems of its own. These problems were
inevitable, considering the formalistic chain of concepts he forged.
Each link showed subsequent strain. The strict use of the "property"
concept made it difficult to distinguish between a "sale" of goods
by means of transfer of a bill of lading, and a financing transaction
(pledge of the bill). 20 This difficulty persisted for almost a century and was heightened by a distinction previously made by the
2 ' had set down the rule that a factor,
law. Paterson v. Tash'1
even
with power of sale, had no power to pledge his principal's goods
for his own debt. It was difficult for judges to see why a factor de116. The change must have been gradual; traces of Snee v. Prescot remained alive
for a considerable time. Thus, though Hibbert v. Carter, 1 T.R. 745, 99 Eng. Rep.
1355 (K.B. 1787), was decided by the same judges as Lickbarrow, and only a very
short while before, it contained language hard to reconcile with Lickbarrow. Hibbert
was an action on an insurance policy; the defense was that the insured had no interest
in the cargo. K, the shipper, was indebted to D, and negotiated to him his retained
shipper's order bill of lading. Plaintiff was the consignee of the goods. At first, Buller
wished to nonsuit the plaintiff' since the "whole property' must be in D; but later the
court changed its mind "on an affidavit stating the particular transaction between the
parties"; K had "no intention whatever of passing the whole property ... [H]is intention [was] ... no more than to bind the consignment of the goods in England.
• . ."Id.at 747,99 Eng. Rep. at 1356. The stress on "intent" seemed to foresee the nineteenth-century system. But see Miller, supra note 115, at 272. But what does "bind
the consignment of the goods to England" mean? It can only refer to the control over
the goods, by means of the retained bill. What D got, in short, were the consignor's
rights under Snee v. Prescot. On the insurance point, of course, the result was sensible
and consistent with eighteenth-century law; yet Buller deliberately ignored it in Lickbarrow v. Mason. See note 104 supra.
117. Le Blanc, counsel for plaintiffs in Slubey & Smith v. Heyward, 2 BI. H. 504,
126 Eng. Rep. 672 (K.B. 1795) cited Loughborough, and argued that his opinion was
still in force. It was mentioned also in Newsome v. Thornton, 6 East 17, 42-43, 102
Eng. Rep. 1189, 1203 (K.B. 1805) (Lawrence, J.). But compared to the myriad citations of Buller's opinion, these were rare indeed.
118. See, e.g., the argument of counsel for plaintiff in Haille v. Smith, 1 Bos. & Pul.
563, 567, 126 Eng. Rep. 1066, 1069 (C.P. 1796):
When a custom has once been found to be a custom of merchants, it becomes by
that finding the law of the land. This doctrine was acted upon by Lord Kenyon
in the case of Hunter v. Buring . . .who refused to hear any evidence respecting
the negotiability of a bill of lading, it having been already admitted upon record
in the special verdict in Lickbarrow v. Mason.
The "special verdict" referred to appears in 5 T.R. at 686, 101 Eng. Rep. at 382.
119. See note 89 supra.
120. See Miller, supra note 115, at 272. Two solutions worth noting are: Hibbert v.
Carter, 1 T.R. 745, 99 Eng. Rep. 1355 (K.B. 1787) ("intention" of the parties), and
Haille v. Smith, 1 Bos. &Pul. 563, 126 Eng. Rep. 1066 (C.P. 1796) ("trust" concept).
121. 2 Str. 1178, 93 Eng. Rep. 1110 (K.B. 1743). Cf. Daubigny v. Duval, 5 T.R.
604, 101 Eng. Rep. 338 (K.B. 1794).
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barred from pledging goods physically should be allowed to do
the same thing by means of a bill of lading. 22 In cases such as Lickbarrow v. Mason, one way out was to treat a financing factor as
"virtually" a buyer. Yet the difficulty was not solely due to defects
in legal reasoning, but was a consequence of the serious problems
raised by the fusion of the law of foreign trade with domestic law.
Paterson v. Tash was a highly appropriate decision -if the underlying fact-situation was that of a sales agent who crept surreptitiously into a pawn-broker's shop. The importing factor-buyer,
who had advanced considerable money to his foreign correspondent, was in a totally different situation. Buller no doubt expected
that by giving the factor-buyer "property," his rights would be
adequately protected; yet the initial rigidity of the reasoning hamstrung the law; and the possibility that the importer might go bankrupt, with the goods unsold and traceable, had to be reckoned with.
But, notwithstanding the problems created, the decision in Lickbarrow v. Mason may be taken to have settled at least two points: First,
that the rights of at least some bona fide transferees of a bill of
lading were superior to the consignor's right to stop, despite the
retained bill.128 Second, that a bill of lading, at least in some sense,
partook of the nature of negotiability and could be used to transfer absolute ownership of goods at sea. Furthermore, of the highest importance was the way in which these results were reached,
that is, by mixing merchant custom with materials from the common
law, and by an increased rigidity of the "property" concept.
Legal scholars are more apt, in general, to find conceptual difficulties insurmountable than are judges. The latter tend to reach
decisions dictated by common sense, by whatever path necessary.
Still, the structure Buller built proved the occasion for much subsequent soul-searching and distinguishing. Haille v. Smith 124 exemplifies the problems well. Here goods were consigned to a merchant
house; the bill of lading, however, was forwarded as collateral security to a banking firm having the same partners as the merchant
house. Unfortunately, the consignor failed before the ship had even
left the home port of Liverpool. The cargo was redelivered to the
assignees in bankruptcy of the consignor. Plaintiffs, holders of the
bill of lading, were successful in their claim. But the court was
122. See Newsom v. Thornton, 6 East 17, 102 Eng. Rep. 1189 (K.B. 1805).
123. But even after Lickbarrow, the retained bill was used to exercise the right of
stoppage where no bona fide purchaser intervened. See, e.g., Hoist v. Pownal, 1 Esp.
240, 170 Eng. Rep. 43 (N.P. 1794). The bill was apparently sent as a matter of course
to the resident agent of the consignor in case of necessity. See Walley v. Montgomery,
3 East 585, 102 Eng. Rep. 721 (K.B. 1803), and the arguments of counsel for defendant in Slubey & Smith v. Heyward, 2 B1. H. 504, 126 Eng. Rep. 672 (K.B. 1795).
124. 1 Bos. & Pul. 563, 126 Eng. Rep. 1066 (C.P. 1796). See the discussion in
Miller, supra note 115, at 278-74.
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much troubled by the risk-of-loss question: if "property" had passed
from the consignor to the holders of the bill of lading, who would
have borne the risk of loss if the goods had been lost at sea? And
suppose the consignees rather than the consignors had failed?
Chief Justice Eyre toyed with a complicated "trust" concept,
though, in fact, the solution to these hypothetical questions should
have been rather easy. The right of stoppage in transit, after all,
did not depend on "property"; neither did the question of risk-ofloss, necessarily. The shift in the concept of "property" merely
meant that Eyre had qualms he would otherwise not have had.' 25
In groping for a key, Eyre at one point urged that courts should
"expound the doctrine of transfer very largely upon the agreement
of the parties.
...
12
In the nineteenth centuny, of course, this
solution became dominant; 2 7 what could be more convenient than
a system of loaded rules, with the intention of the parties as a
safety-valve, if needed? And since Lickbarrow v. Mason had analyzed the respective interests of the possible parties-buyers, sellers, factors, financiers -in a manner awkward within the old
framework, of necessity the judges were forced to direct their attention to the building of a new system. This system would incorporate the actual results of eighteenth-century cases but in a
scheme turning fundamentally about the stricter definition of "property," or, as it came more usually to be termed, of "title."
Meanwhile, we turn to the domestic law, and examine the ways
in which the merchant-rules reacted upon it.
B. Domestic Trade and the Law Merchant
A kind of synthesis of common law and business practice was
accomplished in the law of foreign trade, as we have seen most
clearly in Lickbarrow v. Mason. The same synthesis took place in
the law of domestic trade. Most noticeably, the doctrine of stoppage
in transit, which arose in foreign trade, found the home soil equally
125. Compare Atkins v. Barwick, I Str. 165, 93 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 1719), where
an analogous problem arose in a domestic sale without a bill of lading. A recipient of
goods sent them back out again to defendant, because of scruples over the recipient's
impending bankruptcy. Despite the fact that defendant had no knowledge of the attempted return of the goods, the "property was "altered" in his favor because the
delivery was "with consideration." The difference in treatment of the two cases is explainable largely because (a) the concept of "property" shifted meaning in the intervening years; and (b) land cases were habitually treated somewhat differently from
sea cases.
For an American case of about the same period as Haille, dealing with a rather similar problem, see Wood v. Roach, 1 Yeates 177, 2 Dall. 180 (Pa. 1792).
126. 1 Bos. & Pul. 563, 571, 126 Eng. Rep. 1066, 1070 (C.P. 1796). See Hibbert v.
Carter, 1 T.R. 745,747, 99 Eng. Rep. 1355, 1356 (K.B. 1787).
127. And eventually the solution became enshrined in SAL- or Goons AcT, 1893, 56
& 57 Vict. c. 71, § 17; U.S.A. § 18.
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congenial. This is not surprising, since domestic trade was undergoing a revolution no less drastic than the expansion of foreign
trade-perhaps even more drastic. A number of factors contributed to this development. The rise of industry in northern England
produced an increase in trade from, for example, Liverpool to
London. Population also increased throughout the century.'28 By the
end of the century, smokestacks and steam engines had already
begun to darken the English landscape. Most of the immense internal traffic was carried by water- along the rivers, and on the
canals which were being built. Of special importance was the
coastal traffic skimming along the shoreline. Roads were generally
poor, and land-carriage was expensive, although, to be sure, there
was great improvement during the century. 29 Obviously, like the
"foreign" trade with the plantations, the coastal traffic was not
technically "foreign"; but it was sea-traffic nonetheless, and shared
many of the problems of foreign trade. Therefore, the ease of legal
analogy between foreign and domestic trade is not surprising. Simultaneously, the decline in the special courts (such as the Court
of Admiralty), and the partial transfer of merchant cases to the
common-law tribunals made the king's judicial personnel more familiar with the problems and doctrines of the law merchant; a
kind of "reception" took place.130 The fusion of merchant law and

common law worked by Mansfield and others is justly famous. The
time, of course, was ripe; and the judges were ready and willing.
The decisions involving foreign trade were handy materials which
could be applied to the growing volume of domestic commercial
cases. Of course, there were significant differences in business practice between foreign trade proper and even the domestic water
trade. For one thing, the bill of lading, though in frequent use in
coastal waters, was by no means universal. 3' But in the final analysis,
128. See AsHroN, AN
(1955).

ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND: THE 18TH CENTMY

13

129. Regarding the improvement in internal transport during this century, see IAmmoNm & HAMMoND, THE RisE OF MoDmR INDusTY, ch. V, (1947). But sea com-

merce was still much superior. Adam Smith thought that "six or eight men . . . by
the help of water-carriage, can carry and bring back in the same time the same quantity
of goods between London and Edinburgh as fifty broad-wheeled waggons, attended by
a hundred men, and drawn by four hundred horses." I SMrrH, THE WEALTH OF NATiONS 28 (1776).

130. SuTmmLAND, THE LAw MEncaNr IN ENGLAND IN THE SEvENTEENTH AND
CENTURIEs, 17 ROYAL HIoiucML SocamrY TRANSACTIONS 149 passim
EiGHTEENTu
(4th Ser. 1934).
131. Kinloch v. Craig, 3 T.R. 783, 100 Eng. Rep. 858 (K.B. 1790), is instructive.
The trade described (liquor) was between a Scottish dealer and his London factors.

The goods traveled by water.
Oftentimes no bills of lading were sent with these cargoes, and, when sent, were
not in general indorsed to any person, though the cargoes were thereby made
deliverable to John Steine or his assigns. From 1783 . . . to 1788 .

.

. out of
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the similarities outweighed the differences. Therefore, it is no surprise that the right of stoppage in transit moved swiftly into home
waters.' 32 Perhaps it might even be accurate to state that no distinction ever was made between foreign trade and domestic trade in this
regard. As the domestic water-cases came up, they were simply treated in the same manner as overseas cases. Yet the fact remains that the
right of stoppage was foreign in origin and equitable in tone. Furthermore, while the foreign cases may have depended on the custom of
the retained bill of lading, no such universal custom could have underpinned the domestic cases. This is even clearer concerning carriage by land. No bill of lading was ever issued by common carriers
on land, but the right of stoppage was soon applied here too.133 At

first, in an excessive exuberance, the rule was that a land consignor
might "stop" so long as the goods had not actually come into the "corporal touch" of the consignees. 34 The notion of a "corporal touch"
shows clearly the influence of overseas trade. As we have seen, the
right of stoppage originally meant something little better than a free1 35
for-all, with the "first clear hand" on the goods remaining victorious.
Strictly speaking, the idea of a "corporal touch" was very inappropriate on dry land. Goods in transit were not locked up in the wooden
prison of a ship afloat; and during their travels, the goods were bound
to encounter many "touches." In land cases, therefore, the courts soon
of "corporal touch." 36 The problem of a
receded from the doctrine
"warehouseman's touch" was then faced. These and other "gray"
areas were explored and marked out?r In brief, it was soon held that
a direction to stop, timely given, was sufficient to invoke the right, so
84 consignments of cargoes only 10 were sent with bill of lading regularly
indorsed.
Id. at 784, 100 Eng. Rep. at 858. In Sweet v. Pym, 1 East 4, 102 Eng. Rep. 2 (K.B.
1800), a fuller, upon hearing that his principal was in financial difficulty, went to the
trouble of intercepting the ship on which cloth was being sent back to London, and
made the master execute a bill of lading. These, of course, are not "sales" transactions;
nonetheless, in the "foreign" trade, bills of lading would almost certainly have been
executed anyway.
182. The transition, if there was one, might have been simplest in such a case as
Burghall v. Howard, 1 Bl. H. 366n.(a), 126 Eng. Rep. 215 (N.P. 1759) (domestic
water shipment, but with bill of lading).
133. Lovat v. Parsons, 1 Cowp. 61, 98 Eng. Rep. 967 (K.B. 1774).
134. See Stokes v. La Biviere, cited at 8 T.R. 466. 100 Eng. Rep. 680; Birkett v.
Jenkins, cited at 1 Cowp. 295, 98 Eng. Rep. 1094; and see note 137 infra.
135. See Wiseman v. Vandeputt, 2 Vein. 203, 23 Eng. Rep. 732 (Oh. 1790); Snee
v. Prescot, 1 Atk. 245, 26 Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch. 1743).
136. See, e.g., Ellis v. Hunt, 3 T.R. 464, 100 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B. 1789). In Wright
v. Lawes, 4 Esp. 82, 170 Eng. Rep. 649 (N.P. 1801), Lord Kenyon stated: "I once
said, that, to confer a property on the consignee, a corporal touch was necessary. I
wish the expression had never been used, as it says too much .. " Id. at 85, 170
Eng. Rep. at 650. See Dixon v. Baldwen, 5 East 175, 102 Eng. Rep. 1036 (K.B.
1804) (opinion of Lord Ellenborough).
187. See note 142 infra.
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long as delivery had not been consummated. 188 A parallel development took place in the overseas cases. 139 At any event, by the end of
the eighteenth century, it had been clearly established that the right
of stoppage

40

41
applied to domestic sales transactions of all kinds.

The protection thereby afforded an English merchant proved to
be very attractive. The volume of case law became correspondingly
heavy. Difficult questions arose, of course, as to the precise point at
which the transit ended, 4 but the courts "leaned much in favour of
the power of the consignor to stop his goods . . . [since this was a]

leaning to the furtherance of justice." 143 Internal transportation being
so slow, and the danger of bankruptcy so great, the right was by now
188. See Lovat v. Parsons, 1 Cowp. 61, 98 Eng. Rep. 967 (K.B. 1774); Litt v. Cowley, 7 Taunt. 169, 129 Eng. Rep. 68 (C.P. 1816).
139. The development in overseas cases, of course, was obscured by the problem
of multiple bills of lading. The mechanism of invoking the right of stoppage thus consisted, at least at first, of endorsing the retained bill to an agent at the port of destination. The practice of indemnifying the master and litigating the issue of who has the
ultimate right to the goods, seems to imply a real (if not a theoretical) shift in the
rule for overseas cases. See note 77 supra.
140. Lord Chancellor Hardwicke's opinion in Snee v. Prescot, 1 Atk. 245, 26 Eng.
Rep. 157 (Ch. 1743), seemed to suggest that the right of stoppage in transit, in domestic land-transactions, was as old as the corresponding right in overseas cases, or at
least almost so. Hardwicke stated:
I admit the case . . . of inland dealers in England, that if goods are delivered
to a carrier or hoyman . . . and . . . are lost by the carrier or hoyman, the consignee can only bring the action, which shews the property to be in him ....
But suppose such goods are actually delivered to a carrier . . . and while the carrier is upon the road . . . the consignor hears his consignee is . . . bankrupt
. . . and countermands the delivery, and gets them back into his own possession.
Again . . . no action of trover would lie . . . because the goods, while they
were in transitu,might be so countermanded.
Id. at 248-49, 26 Eng. Rep. at 159. But this seems to be dictum only, since there does
not appear to be any precedent for the right of stoppage in transit in a land case. Perhaps Lord Hardwicke was referring to "delivery" in a technical sense.
141. Lovat v. Parsons, 1 Cowp. 61, 98 Eng. Rep. 967 (K.B. 1774) (indigo transported by wagon); Ellis v. Hunt, 3 T.R. 464, 100 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B. 1789) (files
ordered from Sheflfield manufacturers, to be delivered to buyer in London by means of
"Royle's waggon").
142. A shipment of wine, placed in the cellar of the home of an agent for the consignee, was tasted by the consignee. Was the transit ended? Lord Kenyon thought it
was. Wright v. Lawes, 4 Esp. 82, 170 Eng. Rep. 649 (N.P. 1801). Similarly, where an
agent actually took some of the goods, and repacked the rest. Leeds v. Wright, 4 Esp.
243, 170 Eng. Rep. 706 (1802), (subsequent proceedings) 3 Bos. &Pul. 320, 127 Eng.
Rep. 176 (C.P. 1803). But the possession of a wharfinger at a half-way point in the
transit does not defeat the right. Mills v. Ball, 2 Bos. & Pul. 457, 126 Eng. Rep. 1382
(C.P. 1801). Nor is a vessel in quarantine through with its transit, even though agents
of the consignee had gotten aboard a few days before and opened some crates of oranges. Hoist v. Pownal, 1 Esp. 240, 170 Eng. Rep. 343 (N.P. 1794); see also Ellis v.
Hunt, 3 T.R. 464, 100 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B. 1789). What if a vendee meets goods halfway? Lord Alvanley thought this would defeat the right of stoppage, discussing a land
contract. Mills v. Ball, supra. But see Lord Kenyon, in Holst v. Pownal, supra, discussing a sea-contract.
143. Northey v. Field, 2 Esp. 613, 614-15, 170 Eng. Rep. 472, 473 (K.B. 1797);
of. Hodgson v. Loy, 7 T.R. 440, 101 Eng. Rep. 1065 (K.B. 1797).
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as essential for the land consignor as for the merchant overseas. Available records show a tremendous incredse in the number of business
failures over the course of the eighteenth century; in 1732 there were
164 such failures, in 1793 there were 1256. The latter year was exceptional, but the general trend was nonetheless sharply upward.1 44 This
increase, of course, was not entirely an unhealthy sign. Trade had expanded greatly. The normal quantum of business failures was apt to
be pyramided by the financial interdependence of the merchant community, the shortage of actual hand-to-hand money (as opposed to
credit), 145 and perhaps also by the nature of the law of bankruptcy,
which allowed swift, sudden, secret "acts of bankruptcy.14 The right
of stoppage in transit protected the merchant who might otherwise be
caught in a chain-reaction of failures. It also gave a grace-period to
a manufacturer or seller who transported goods to buyers or merchant-agents in London or other cities. The sympathy of the courts is
fairly clear from the results of the cases. Part payment did not destroy
the right,nor did the fact that the carrier was the buyer's choice, or
that the buyer had a special arrangement with the carrier.147 If anything, the seller had a more perfect right domestically than was allowed in overseas trade. The favor of the judges was matched by the
audacity of lawyers, who attempted to push the doctrine as far as it
would go-and further. In 1797, counsel tried to apply the right to
a remittance of money but did not succeed. 48 Still, stoppage in transit
showed its vitality by analogical growth. In the beginning of the
nineteenth century, stoppage was occupying some of the ground later
to be inhabited by the so-called seller's lien-that is, it was invoked
successfully in sales transactions which strictly speaking had no "transit" in them at all. 49 In Withers v. Lyss, decided by Chief Justice
Gibb in 1815, the right to stop in transit was invoked by name to
protect a seller of resin which never budged from its warehouse. 50
Yet all this time the right belonged only to sellers or those in the posi144. See AsirroN, AN EcoNoMIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND: THE 18Tn CENTua 254
(1955).
145. AsnioN, op. cit. supra note 144, at 173.
146. See, e.g., Lingood v. Eade, 1 Atk. 196, 26 Eng. Rep. 127 (Ch. 1747); see
generally 2 BLAE
C~NE, ComAnvuazs ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 933-46 (Lewis ed.
1902). For an interesting account of the earlier antecedents of the bankruptcy laws,
see Treiman, Escaping the Creditor in the Middle Ages, 43 L.Q. REV. 230 (1927).

147. Hodgson v. Loy, 7 T.R. 440, 101 Eng. Rep. 1065 (K.B. 1797). The rule in
overseas cases, as might be expected, was somewhat different at first, and more neutral." Thus, if the shipment were made on a ship owned or chartered by the buyer
(consignee), the right of stoppage in transit did not survive. Boehtlinck v. Schneider,
3 Esp. 58, 170 Eng. Rep. 537 (N.P. 1799) ; Bohtlingk [sic] v. Inglis, 3 East 381, 102

Eng. Rep. 643 (K.B. 1803).
148. Smith v. Bowles, 2 Esp. 578, 170 Eng. Rep. 461 (N.P. 1797).
149. Owenson v. Morse, 7 T.R. 64, 101 Eng. Rep. 856 (K.B. 1796) (plate in the
hands of an engraver is "in transit") (Lord Kenyon, C.J.).
150. Withers v. Lyss, 4 Camp. 237, 171 Eng. Rep. 76 (N.P. 1815).
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tion of sellers. An ordinary bailee, even when armed with a lien, did
not have its protection past the moment of shipment. 151 Furthermore,
as inthe foreign trade cases, much confusion remained as to the precise relationship between the right of stoppage in transit and "property." This confusion, in part caused by Lickbarrow v. Mason, clouded the air for a number of years. The language of some of the cases
clearly shows the after-effects. 5 '
While the right of stoppage grew luxuriantly, another law merchant doctrine, market overt, shriveled away. This, however, is only
superficially a paradox. Though market overt had roots in the law
merchant, the kind of business typified by the medieval fair and
market place was losing its relative importance. 5 3 The natural tendency of the common law to protect an original owner or seller and
to safeguard his rights from persons committing fraud, gained dominance over the antiquated freedom of the open market. Among other things the industrial revolution meant the increasing impersonalization of business. Problems of financial treachery were of course
acute in overseas trade just as they were in the home islands. Nonetheless, the overseas merchants formed a tight little clique, often
interconnected by blood or marriage.' 54 The paramount fear of the
merchants in foreign trade was of the onset of bankruptcy, which
might strike suddenly. The same paramount fear was characteristic
of domestic distance-sales, which came more and more to resemble
foreign trade in law and practice. But fraud, on the other hand, was
and remained the chief "bugaboo" of the stationarysale. The ancient
market overt provided a convenient vent for stolen or misappropriated goods. Before the beginning of the eighteenth century, market
overt had broken out of its narrow boundaries and had been greatly
151. Sweet v. Pyne, 1 East 4, 102 Eng. Rep. 2 (K.B. 1800). In Kinloch v. Craig, 3
T.R. 783, 787, 100 Eng. Rep. 858, 859 (K.B. 1790), Eyre stated that "the right of
stopping in transitu was out of the question; that never occurring but as between vendor and vendee." Significantly, whatever relaxation of this rule there was, applied to
factors only. See note 84 supra.
152. Lord Kenyon's dictum in Wright v. Lawes, 4 Esp. 82, 85, 170 Eng. Rep. 649,
650 (N.P. 1801), that "to confer a property on the consignee, a corporal touch was
necessary," is a good example of confusion. Perhaps one cause of the trouble is the
relatively new problem of applying bankruptcy rules to land contracts. There is an interesting line of cases in which an honorable but insolvent consignee attempted to call
off purchases made on the eve of bankruptcy. Compare Salte v. Field, 5 T.R. 211, 101
Eng. Rep. 119 (K.B. 1793), with Smith v. Field, 5 T.R. 402, 191 Eng. Rep. 225 (K.B.
1793). Under a later analysis, the question might be whether the transit was ended.
In these cases, we find the archaic question of whether the contract was "completed"
or "perfected." See, e.g., Barnes v. Freeland, 6 T.R. 80, 87, 101 Eng. Rep. 447, 450
(K.B. 1794) (Grose, J.).
Here too it might have been asked whether the consignee's action was a "preference." But in a sense, every exercise of the right of stoppage is a "preference."
153. AsirroN, op. cit supra note 144, at 63.
154. For an example from the Portuguese trade of the middle eighteenth century,
see SuTrmu-,AND, A LONDON MEcHArN 1692-1774, 24-25 (1983).
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extended; every shop in London, for example, was a "market
overt."-"' But the doctrine had passed its prime many years before.
By the late sixteenth century, the common law lawyers seemed ready
to strangle this merchant's concept with learning. 156 In the eighteenth
century, there was a further tendency to shrink the scope of market
overt. One device used was a statute which provided that an original
owner could reclaim his goods, if he prosecuted or gave evidence
against the person responsible for his loss and secured a conviction.'57 This was primarily a law-enforcement device, and the original
statute was silent as to its application to market overt. Judicially, however, this ancient doctrine was extended to market overt. 58 Nevertheless, though committees were formed in the eighteenth century by
manufacturing interests ' to encourage prosecutions under the statute, owners' rights were still basically dependent on the vicissitudes
of the criminal law. Furthermore, an action of trover lay only against
the party actually in possession after the conviction. 60 The possessor
could escape liability by conveying away the goods at any time before the action was brought. And the act was held to apply only to
felonious taking of the goods and not to fraudulent misapplication.''
In general, the problem of disappearing goods, in a complex society,
was too vast to be solved by such half-measures. A social problem of
this kind cannot be solved by the formulation of legal rules, but the
law is expected at least to cooperate in the solution.
Theoretically, the growth of internal trade, that is, the spilling-over
of sales transactions from the narrow confines of ancient fairs and
markets, might have stimulated a corresponding rise in the use of
market overt. To do so would have given goods the benefit of a kind
of negotiability. But this was insupportable. Property, it was felt,
had to be better protected. To take one example, prior to the mature
factory age, manufacturers, particularly in the textile industries, "put
155. See The Case of Market-Overt, 5 Co. Rep. 836, 77 Eng. Rep. 180 (K.B. 1597).
156. Ibid. See also Hartop v. Hoare, 3 Atk. 44, 26 Eng. Rep. 828 (K.B. 1743).
157. 21 Hen. VI c. 11 (1529).
158. See Anonymous, 12 Mod. 521, 88 Eng. Rep. 1492 (K.B. 1701); Pease, The
Change of the Propertyin Goods by Sale in Market Overt, 8 CoLum. L. REv. 875, 381
(1908). Probably the intent of the statute was nothing more than to extend an already
existing legal doctrine to the case of an owner who merely gives evidence against the
thief. Stautes from the sixteenth century did, however, narrow the protection of
market overt rules as they applied to stolen horses; 1555, 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 7; 1589,
31 Eliz. 1, c. 12; and this fossil is still preserved in England in the SALE OF GooDs
AcT, 1883, 56 & 57 Viet., c. 71, § 22(2). See also JONEs, THE PosmoN AND Rices
OF A BONA FmE POncHAsER FOR VALUE OF GooDs IMRoPEBLY OBTAINm

33-49

(1921).
159. AsnroN, op. cit. supra note 128, at 210.

160. Horwood v. Smith, 2 T.R. 750, 100 Eng. Rep. 404 (K.B. 1788).
161. This was apparently the main thrust of Parker v. Patrick, 5 T.R. 175, 101 Eng.
Rep. 99 (K.B. 1793). Otherwise, the case would be difficult to fit into eighteenth century patterns.
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out" materials to many individual workers, scattered throughout the
country-side, or in the villages. The goods were often of high market
value, and the owners retained very little physical control over them.
Embezzlement was, in this context, an enormous problem. The goods
had a way of shrinking, disappearing, or finding their way into the
hands of a pawnbroker. 62 This is a special case, but the general case
is equally cogent. As the movement of goods from raw materials to
market became more complex, goods passed through more and more
hands; the possibilities of light fingers or unethical hands at various
stations on the way increased beyond the power of the owner to control.1 63 The statement of Chancellor Kent, although made in reference

to the United States, was also applicable to the situation in England,
and indicates clearly the judges' point of view:
[Wlhen notions of property were slight, a bona fide purchase of stolen
goods, gave a good title against the original owner; but . . . in the pro-

gress of society, property acquired such stability and energy, as to affect
the subject wherever found, and to exclude even an honest purchaser,
when the title of his vendor was discovered to be defective. It was also
a principle in the English common law, that a sale out of market-overt
did not change the property against the rightful owner, and the custom
of the city of London, which forms an exception to the general rule,
has always been . . . restricted by the courts with unusual jealousy
64

and vigilance.1

Kent's language suggests a definite awareness of how the concept of
property had shifted during the eighteenth century. It had gained,
as Kent put it, "stability" and "energy." The eighteenth century, of
course, was an age in which the doctrine that "property" must be pro162. AsirroN, op. cit. supra note 128, at 208-10. And see the very interesting tract,
An Apology for the Business of Pawn-Broking, By a Pawn-Broker, in A SErmCT COLLEacoN OF ScARCE AND VAr.uAr.E EcoNoNucAL TRAcrs 105 (McCulloch 1859),
especially where the author answers the objection that pawn-broking is "found to give
encouragement to various mechanics, to pawn other peoples' goods; such as taylors,
mantua-makers .. .and journeymen workmen their master's goods, which they have
to manufacture." Id. at 146. This the author admits to be a weighty objection, but
counters that the owner has a remedy to recover his goods, unlike "market-overt."
But see Parker v. Patrick, 5 T.R. 175, 101 Eng. Rep. 99 (K.B. 1793). The anonymous
author suggests as one remedy that workers be paid more promptly. This would have
been difficult, however, in the eighteenth century, when ready money was scarce. Some
relief was accorded to the pawn-brokers by statute. See, e.g., 24 Geo. 3 c. 42 (1784);
30 Geo. 2, c. 24 (1757), which forbade the pawning of goods without the permission
of the owner and punished the knowing reception of goods intrusted "to wash, scour,
iron, mend or make up.
163. The many regulatory acts of the eighteenth century, such as the Act of 29
Geo. 3 c. 26 (1789) licensing hawkers and peddlers, suggest how deeply Parliament
worried about the problem - and also how ineffective the statutes it passed must have
been. The system of customs and the close regulation of imports and exports militated
against any extension of market-overt ideas - the "no-questions-asked" mentality. This
was during the same century that Parliament forbade by statute the offering of rewards
for lost goods, no-questions-asked. 25 Geo. 2 c. 36 (1752).
164. Wheelwright v. Depeyster, 1 Johns. R. 471, 480 (N.Y. 1806). This was echoed
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tected at all costs became dominant. And this philosophic notion must
have been influential, in certain subtle ways in the law courts too.'65
The same force is revealed in the rise of copyrights and patents, 66 the
growth of a doctrine of "insurable interest" in insurance law, and no
doubt in many other portions of the decisional and statutory law as
well.
But while the common law and Parliament struggled to give property rights "stability" and "energy2" as against light fingers and giddy
heads, the foreign trade demanded with equal force the protection
of the interests of the merchant-factor. A compromise was in order.
On the one hand, a pure bailee, with no authority to sell goods, was
allowed to pass no "title," except insofar as the dying law of market
overt remained in effect. On the other hand, the factor retained the
benefit of the merchant rules of foreign trade. Thus the factor had a
lien for his general balance on all goods in his possession;' 67 a dyer of
cloth, for example, did not.' If a factor sold goods as his own, his
merchant buyer could set off debts owed by the factor, against any
demand later made by the principal. 16 9 And "factor" meant merchant,
by and large. A judicious use of "estoppel" and "apparent authority"
allowed these two somewhat inconsistent lines of precedent to be
treated as one. The full systematization, within a "title"mframework,
came to flower of course only in the nineteenth century.1
Different treatment was demanded by the problem of risk of loss.
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Ventress v. Smith, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.)
161 (1836).
165. See generally L nxN, PoPERTY IN T EiGHTEENTh CmrruY, w=rH SPECrAL
REFmNCE TO ENGLAND AND LocKE (1930). Of course, to equate such philosophic
notions of "absolute property rights" with the kind of "property" rights discussed in this
Article, in one sense, is to make a bad pun. But more deeply, there must be a connection between the protection of "property" (in general), and the protection of "property" (in particular), as evidenced by such things as the decline in the doctrine of market
overt. This guess is reinforced by the fact that the eighteenth-century "property"
rules later hardened into a fairly subtle seler-biased system.
Ironically, both laissez faire theories stressing "property" rights, and the elaborate
mercantile regulation of the eighteenth century, tend to be suspicious of any marketovert system of law - but for different reasons. Economic liberals would view marketovert as a device to cheat owners of their "property" rights, and encourage embezzlement; mercantilists would perceive in it a loophole in rules against smuggling and the
like.
166. See 11 HoL;DswOaTh, HIsroRY OF ENGLISH LAw 424-32 (1938).
167. Kruger v. Wilcox, 1 Arnb. 252, 27 Eng. Rep. 168 (Ch. 1755).
168. Green v. Farmer, 1 Bl W. 651, 96 Eng. Rep. 379 (K.B. 1768).
169. George v. Claggett, 2 Esp. 557, 170 Eng. Rep. 454 (N.P. 1797); Rabone v.
Williams, 7 T.R. 860n.(a), 101 Eng. Rep. 1020 (1785) (Lord Mansfield).
170. This is not to deny that difficulties were posed by the direction the law had
taken. The experimenting with the problem of the factor, evidenced by the early nineteenth-century Factors' Acts, see Miller, Bills of Lading and Factors in Nineteenth
Century English Overseas Trade, 24 U. Cm. L. R1Ev. 256, 282 (1957), shows one
source of trouble. The problems, however, should not be glibly explained as due solely
to the stubbornness of judges. There was a delicate balance to be reached, about
which reasonable men differed.
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Risk of loss is most acute in distance contracts-whether domestic
or foreign. It has little or nothing to do with bankruptcy, fraud, and
the like. Nor is it concerned with "fault"; one of two innocent parties
is bound to suffer when goods, in the shadowy area between clear
ownerships, are accidentally destroyed.
For reasons not entirely clear, risk-of-loss cases are very rare in
the eighteenth century. Of course, goods at sea were generally insured, and marine insurance, as is well known, developed at a far
more rapid pace than its land analogues.17 1 And the question of "insurable interest" was less serious; this concept developed slowly
during the century. 172 Still, some great merchants never insured
at all;' 7 and while common carriers became, in the famous words
of Mansfield, "insurers" during the period,7 4 not all hazards were
"insured" against- acts of God and the public enemy (there were
many of these) presented cases of potential loss.' 7 5 In hand-to-hand
sales, risk generally followed possession, and little trouble could arise.
Whatever the cause, at the beginning of the eighteenth century,
fact-situations with risk-of-loss features tended to be posed as procedural questions. Who, as between consignor and consignee, had
the right to invoke the liability of carrier or underwriter? In foreign
trade, this is the problem of Evans v. Martell. 7 Notice that in Evans
v. Martell it was irrelevant whether or not the goods were insured, or
if they were insured, who insured them. The case is concerned solely
with the "right face in the courtroom." The decision turned, as noted,
on the primitive meaning of "property." 77 A consignee (unless a
"mere" factor and so labelled on the bill of lading) had enough "property" to use the ship's owners. Later, Snee v. Prescot hinted that the
consignee's right was exclusive.1 7 At least one case showed a more
permissive attitude, suggesting that either party might have the action.'1 Strictly speaking, under the old view of "property," either
party should have been entitled to bring suit; but this somewhat hap171. The title of Park's famous treatise is significant: A

SYsTmvr OF THE LAW OF

MARNE INSURANCES, wITH TmEE CnAPrEBs ON Borrommny; ON INSURANCES ON LxvEs;
AND oN INSURANCES AAnIsT Fns (London &Philadelphia ed. 1789). Park cited only

two cases involving fire insurance. Id. at 502.
172. See Vance, Early History of Insurance Law, 8 COLUm. L. REv. 1, 16 (1908).
173. See STHER_ AND, op. cit. supra note 154, at 43.
174. Forward v. Pittard, 1 T.R. 27, 99 Eng. Rep. 953 (K.B. 1785).
175. STORY, LAw OF BALvrENTs, § 489 (8th ed. 1870); see Company of the Proprietors of the Navigation from the Trent to the Mersey v. Wood, 4 Doug. 286, 99 Eng.
Rep. 884 (K.B. 1785) ; Forward v. Pittard, supra note 174; see also the important discussion in Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 918, 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 112 (K.B.
1701); PATON, BAIEMwrNT I THE COMMON LAw 84-89 (1952). The common-carrier
cases typically involved land and inland sea carriers, but not always.
176. 1 Ld. Raym. 272, 91 Eng. Rep. 1078 (K.B. 1697).
177. See text following note 44 supra.
178. See Lord Hardwicke's statement quoted in note 140 supra.
179. See Moore v. Wilson, 1 T.R. 659, 99 Eng. Rep. 1306 (K.B. 1787).
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hazard view could not long be sustained; considering the shift in the
meaning of "property," strictness was inevitable. The right to sue
must eventually belong to the one who has "property." By the end
of the century, this could be only one person at a time; and that person had to be the consignee. Lord Kenyon, for one, could not allow
the argument that "the right of property on which this action is
founded is to fluctuate, according to the choice of the consignor or
consignee; and that consequently either of them may, at his pleasure,
1"0 This new stiffness,
maintain an action against the carrier. ......

though still basically procedural, also had consequences for the substantive law. If the sole right to sue was in the consignee, then in all
fairness the consignee should bear the loss if the suit failed or was
barred for some reason. There is, of course, a slight non sequiturhere.
Still, the groundwork was laid for the nineteenth-century risk-of-loss
system, which turned the consignee's procedural advantage into a
substantive disadvantage for buyers.
Overlapping the line of cases just discussed are the cases which expound the rule that "delivery to the carrier is delivery to the buyer."
This gnomic phrase still has legal relevance today. It is used to prove
that a consignee has "property" during transit, and that therefore he
should bear the risk of loss at that time. This rule has its roots in the
eighteenth century or earlier. 8" The rule was perhaps first used to fix
the point of "delivery" where "delivery" was a legally relevant consideration. One obvious example was the action for goods sold and
delivered.' 2 At first, "delivery" coincided with shipment more or less
in accord with realities. The courts asked such questions as: for
whose account were goods ordered, or, was the consignee a principal
180. Dawes v. Peck, 8 T.R. 330, 332, 101 Eng. Rep. 1417, 1418 (K.B. 1799) prior
proceedings,3 Esp. 12, 170 Eng. Rep. 521 (N.P. 1799). This was a purely domestic
land transaction. Goods were sent by "Peck's waggon" from Warwickshire. Lord Kenyon felt that the consignor had no right to bring the action; "the consignor, by the
delivery [to the carrier] . . .had fixed the consignee with the goods; and that no property resided in him: that that disabled him from bringing the action for the loss of
the goods . . .that loss must fall on . . . the consignee, who might certainly maintain an action....
Id. at 14, 170 Eng. Rep. at 522.
181. In Godfrey v. Furzo, 3 P. Wins. 185, 186, 24 Eng. Rep. 1022 (Ch.1733),
counsel stated that
on delivery of the goods to the master of the ship beyond sea . . . the property
immediately became vested in the merchant in London, who was to run the risk
of the voyage . . . [like] the case of a tradesman in London [transporting goods
to a country tradesman] .. .in which case, though the country trader does not
appoint or name the carrier, who afterwards embezzles the goods, the trader in
the country must stand to the loss ...
Nothing in the opinion of Lord Chancellor King refutes this argument.
The statement in Godfrey v. Furzo resembles that in the Uniform Sales Act; however, whereas in the nineteenth century risk followed "property," it would be more
accurate to say that in the eighteenth century property tended to follow risk. See note
38 supra.
182. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
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or a factor ?138 Unfortunately, these were not easy questions to answer
in terms of eighteenth-century business. Later the question whether
"delivery" legally occurred at shipping point or destination may have
depended on who paid the freight.' Carried to its logical extreme,
this would mean the holder of the bill of lading, in ocean trade, took
"delivery," since a bill of lading, normally worded, bound the master
to deliver to A or order, either A or order paying freight. This was logically untenable, and suggests a land-locked origin for the rule. As it
developed, the rule tended to become nothing more than an alternate
way of phrasing the case-decisions on right of action for loss of goods.
It was certainly not meant to apply to the right of stoppage in transit,
although literally understood, it would, since "delivery" puts an end
to the right. "Delivery" to the carrier was delivery to the buyer only
for other purposes. 85 The phrase thus aims toward a risk of loss rule,
which is its present status; as such, it is pro-seller in its bias. Again, it
to decide that "title" passed on
remained for the nineteenth century
86
delivery of goods to the carrier.
The eighteenth century, of course, knew no such clear-cut use for
the rule. As far as the domestic market was concerned, the rule was
still concerned with fairly objective factors. In Vale v. Bayle,8ST the
vendee ordered goods, specifically directing that they not be sent by
way of Bristol (the sea route), but by "land carriage." As it happened,
only one land-carrier was available for the route. The goods were
lost, and the vendor brought an action for goods sold and delivered.
The risk, Lord Mansfield felt, was properly on the buyer. It was much
as "if the defendant had mentioned the Birmingham carrier particularly by name; for there being but one carrier, the plaintiff had no
choice .

. . ."

He then added: "If a vendor take upon himself actual-

ly to deliver the goods to the vendee, he stands to all risques; but if
the vendee order a particular mode of conveyance, the vendor is excused."' 8 Clearly, we have no modem "risk of loss" case here; fur183. Evans v. Martell, 1 Ld. Raym. 272, 91 Eng. Rep. 1078 (K.B. 1697).
184. See Davis v. James, 5 Burr. 2680, 98 Eng. Rep. 407 (K.B. 1770), an action
brought by a consignor against a common carrier where Lord Mansfield said: "The
vesting of the property may differ according to the circumstances of cases: but it does
not enter into the present question. This is an action upon the agreement between the
plaintiffs and the carrier. The plaintiffs were to pay him. Therefore the action is prop"Id. at 2680-81, 98 Eng. Rep. at 408. See Moore v. Wilson, 1 T.R.
erly brought ....
659, 99 Eng. Rep. 1306 (K.B. 1787).
185. Ellis v. Hunt, 3 T.R. 464, 100 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B. 1789), showed that "delivery" to the carrier did not destroy the right of stoppage.
186. Fragano v. Long, 4 B. &C. 219, 107 Eng. Rep. 1040 (K.B. 1825), is the "leading" case, although somewhat transitional in tone. Fraganowas not a pure risk-of-loss
case but an action against a shipowner who disputed plaintiff's right to bring the suit.
187. 1 Cowp. 294, 98 Eng. Rep. 1094 (K.B. 1775).
188. Id. at 296, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1095; BuL.nm, Ns Parus 36 (6th ed. 1793). See
Assignees of Burghall v. Howard, 1 Bl. H. 366n., 126 Eng. Rep. 215 (1759), where it
was assumed, in an overseas case, that if no particular ship is named, the shipper bears
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thermore, the qualifications spelled out by Mansfield are far from the
developed nineteenth-century system, where the vendee usually bore
the risk. But it is also clear how little manipulation would be later
required to turn Vale v. Bayle into a true risk of loss case. All that was
needed was to make the case turn on "title," to presume the passage
of title at the point of delivery to the carrier (since that was a "delivery to the buyer") and to eliminate the "Mansfieldian" qualifications. 8 9 Even the later exception to the rule, that is, that a deviation
in the prescribed mode of shipment shifts the risk back to the vendor, 90 is foreshadowed in the eighteenth century-indeed, as early
as Snee v. Prescot.'91
Still other eighteenth century decisions are of interest in showing
the pedigree of nineteenth century rules of "title." Thus Payne v.
Cave'9 2 is the source of the modem doctrine that title passes to auctioned goods when the goods are "knocked down" to the buyer. 93 But
in Payne v. Cave the issue was not framed in terms of considerations
of "title." The question was approached from the standpoint of mutuality of assent in contract. Such assent, said the court, was "signified
on the part of the seller by knocking down the hammer. . ...194
Similarly, the seller's right to have an action for the price depended,
in the nineteenth century, on whether "title" had passed. But the
the risk. This and Vale v. Byle clashed somewhat with the argument of counsel in
Godfrey v. Furzo, note 181 supra, and it seems likely that here too there has been a
fusion of two lines of cases, though the evidence is fragmentary. Delivery to a common
carrier was delivery of risk to the buyer first and foremost in land cases, only
secondarily in overseas cases. In this respect too, merchant custom lost out to the
common law.
In Vale v. Bayle, Buller argued (as counsel for defendant) that there was no "delivery." The plaintiff might have countermanded the goods (that is, stopped in transit) and consequently the goods were not the defendant's "property." Mansfield,
anticipating Bller's own opinion subsequently in Lickbarrow v. Mason, replied that
the "vendor before actual possession by the vendee has a lien .... But that has
no relation to a transaction, as this is, between vendor and vendee."
189. In result, if not in language, the modem rule appears as early as Goom v.
Jackson, 5 Esp. 112, 170 Eng. Rep. 756 (N.P. 1803).
190. E.g., St. John Bros. Co. v. Falkson, 237 Mass. 899, 180 N.E. 51 (1921).
191. "It has been objected, that . . .it was [the consignee's] . . . risque only.
But suppose any damage had happened to these goods during the voyage, and in
transituthere had been an alteration of the consignment, the loss clearly must have
been borne by the consignor." Snee v. Prescot, 1 Atk. 245, 249-50, 26 Eng. Rep.
157, 160 (Ch. 1743) (Lord Hardwicke).
192. 8 T.R. 148, 100 Eng. Rep. 502 (K.B. 1789).
193. U.S.A. § 21(2) speaks of the sale as "complete" when the hammer falls.
The cases, however, speak of the passage of "tite." E.g., Stanhope State Bank v.
Peterson, 205 Iowa 578, 218 N.W. 262 (1928).
194. Payne v. Cave, 3 T.R. 147, 149, 100 Eng. Rep. 502, 503 (K.B. 1789). Compare Mertens v. Adcock, 4 Esp. 251, 170 Eng. Rep. 709 (K.B. 1802), an action for
damages for not removing goods sold at a public auction. Lord Ellenborough
remarked that, "As soon as the lot was knocked down ... [defendant] became the
buyer: they were goods bargained and sold." Id. at 252, 170 Eng. Rep. at 709.
See also Simon v. Metivier, 1 B]. W. 599, 96 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1766).
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same results were often reached even earlier than the eighteenth
century by using other rationales. In Knight v. Hopper,95 decided in
1697, one hundred pieces of muslin were sold, at forty shillings per
piece. The pieces were to be taken away ten at a time, and paid for as
they were carried off. Holt remarked that:
The pieces being marked and sealed, the property is altered immediately,
and . . . they remained only as a security for the money. . . [I]f they
are not taken away upon request in a reasonable time, the party may have
an action for his money, but may not sell the goods.' 96

The term "property," of course, is used in its archaic sense. But all
that we need do is substitute "tile" for "property" and the seller's lien
for "security for the money," and ignore the phrase about "request,"
and we have the modem law.1 7 These differences are substantial and
conceal a great deal of later development, but it is clear on what basis
the nineteenth-century system was erected. Knight v. Hopper, of
course, is concerned only with the question of when the contract is
"complete" and the property "altered" for the sake of bringing a specific kind of action. The insistence on a "request" means that we are
still in the domain of contract, and not yet in that of "sale." One hundred years later, Lord Kenyon refused a seller's claim for goods
"sold"; the buyer had never claimed his purchase and the seller found
another buyer. In Lord Kenyon's view the plaintiff-seller had "abandoned his right to insist on the defendant['s] taking the goods, he had
not considered them as the property of the defendant, or the contract
as complete . . . ." '9 Here the "sale" concept of property and the
contractual approach were mentioned in the same breath, as it were.
The latter, in Kenyon's case, still prevailed. But this was almost the
end of the line; Lord Kenyon still looked for a "request" and emphasized procedural etiquette, but the signs of the new field of law- half
common law, half law merchant-were clearly visible. The "property" concept had tightened in meaning while expanding in coverage. "99
' Another example of this movement, already alluded to, was
the shift in construction of the Statute of Frauds. In Towers v. Osborne,200 decided early in the eighteenth century, the seventeenth
section of the statute was held not to apply to anything but "contracts for the actual sale of goods, where the buyer is immediately
195. 1 Holt, 8, 90 Eng. Rep. 902 (K.B. 1697).
196. Ibid.
197. But a seller in possession may now, in a proper case, sell the goods to
realize on his lien. U.S.A. § 60; D'Aprile v. Turner-Looker Co., 239 N.Y. 427, 147
N.E. 15 (1925).
198. Hore v. Milner, 1 Peake 58, 59, 170 Eng. Rep. 78 (N.P. 1797).
199. See Chaplin v. Rogers, 1 East 191, 102 Eng. Rep. 75 (K.B. 1800), for
example, where the old concept of "delivery" is expanded out of recognition for
ponderous" goods.
200. 1 Str. 506, 98 Eng. Rep. 664 (N.P. 1722).
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answerable, without time given him by special agreement, and the
seller is to deliver the goods immediately." Consequently, the statute
was no defense where the defendant "bespoke a chariot, and when it
20
was made refused to take it ....
' This is certainly a narrow view
of the statute. But the court was thinking only of hand-to-hand sales.
If no money changed hands, and no goods changed hands, the sale
might be void as to creditors of the seller. The statute made it void
as to buyers as well. Within its narrow area, the statute insisted on
formality; perhaps it itself was a source of formality. Where delivery
was not possible on the spot, where "property" could not be "altered"
immediately, the statute had no part to play. This explains the case
of the chariot, and the view expressed in Towers v. Osbornepersisted
until late in the century.0 2 When it was finally repudiated in Rondeau v. Wyatt,20 3 Lord Loughborough made the interesting remark
that the statute was not merely an anti-perjury act; "another object
was to lay down a clear and positive rule to determine when the contract of sale should be complete."20 4 Whether or not Lord Loughboroughs idea is historically correct, the learned judge, in overturning the old line of cases, must have implied that a contract could be
"complete" without formality, that is, that there might be such a thing
as a consensual sale. Towers v. Osborne was distinguished halfheartedly on the grounds that something remained to be done to
the goods. Both of these ideas -the idea of the consensual sale, and
the idea that a sale is not "complete" until the work on the goods is
completed-later became, of course, pillars of the nineteenthcentury system of "titles."20 5
CONCLUSION

We have seen that the eighteenth century, when dealing with commercial cases, arrived at an amalgamation of the two chief strains in
its history - the common law and the law merchant of foreign trade.
201. Ibid.
202. Clayton v. Andrews, 4 Burr. 2101, 98 Eng. Rep. 96 (K.B. 1767); see
Alexander v. Comber, 1 B. H. 20, 126 Eng. Rep. 13 (C.P. 1788). In ruling that
the Statute of Frauds did not apply to auction sales, Lord Mansfield emphasized that
the goods were immediately deliverable, thus distinguishing Towers v. Osborne.
Simon v. Metivier, 1 B. W. 599, 96 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1766) also reported sub
nom. Simon v. Motivos, 3 Burr. 1921, 97 Eng. Rep. 1170 (K.B. 1766).
203. 2 B. H. 63, 126 Eng. Rep. 430 (C.P. 1792), followed by Cooper v. Elston,
7 T.R. 14, 101 Eng. Rep. 830 (K.B. 1796).
204. Rondeau v. Wyatt, supra note 203, at 68, 126 Eng. Rep. at 433.
205. "Where there is a contract to sell specific goods and the seller is bound to
do something to the goods, for the purpose of putting them into a deliverable state,
the property does not pass until such things be done." U.S.A. § 19(2); see also SATE
oF GooDs Acr 1893, 56 & 57 Viet., c. 71, § 18(2). The important early cases include
Rugg v. Minett, 11 East 210, 103 Eng. Rep. 985 (K.B. 1809); Hinde v. Whitehouse,
7 East 558, 103 Eng. Rep. 216 (K.B. 1806); Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East 614, 102
Eng. Rep. 1425 (K.B. 1805).
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We have also noted the shift in the meaning of "property," from a
procedural-formal stage, to something in the nature of an absolute
right. At the end of the century, however, the fusion of the two historical strains was still not quite complete, and the fabric of rules appeared disorderly and haphazard.
This situation was not of long duration. The dawn of the nineteenth
century brought a rapid series of "leading cases," and the unitary system of sales law based on the concept of "title" was hammered out. All
earlier rules were recast (in so far as they were to be retained) in
terms of the passage of title. In Tarling v. Baxter 00 the consensual
sale came into its own; risk of loss passed, along with "title," to a hapless buyer of a haystack which had not been moved from its spot,
and which had not been paid for. This case, while not the earliest
of the "leading" cases of the nineteenth century, 07 is perhaps the
most cogent, and the most typical. Within the new system, every advantage was to be given to the seller. "Title," for risk purposes, was
to pass as early as possible. The financial needs of the seller were
to be served, however, by a variety of devices, of which the seller's
right of stoppage in transit were among the most
lien and the
208
important.

The contrast between the two centuries is worth stressing once
again. The eighteenth century was much concerned with fair play,
with regulating the commercial law according to the reasonable psychological expectations of merchants, as far as foreign trade was concerned. The old formal system was preserved for domestic trade, to
avoid the horrors of fraud. The new century had different aims. To
all appearances, its law was uniform. "Title" was located in such a
way as to favor the seller, of course, but masked by the veneer of reason and the "intention of the parties." That neither logic nor the intention of the partieswas basic to the new system is proved beyond a
doubt by the number of ancient rules retained because their results
were acceptable under the new standards, and which were simply recast in new terms. Within the new system, the old mercantile principles remained but were definitely circumscribed. Market overt lived
on, a meaningless fossil; semi-negotiable documents of title were allowed to occupy their own special niche, either conforming to the
general rules of "title," or being granted the dispensation of "excep206. 6 B. & C. 360, 108 Eng. Rep. 484 (K.B. 1827), curiously foreshadowed in
Chaplin v. Rogers, 1 East 191, 102 Eng. Rep. 75 (K.B. 1800), which was not,
however, a risk of loss case. See also Hankey v. Smith, 1 Peake 57n.(a)2, 170 Eng.
Rep. 77 (K.B. 1796).
207. See cases cited note 205 supra.
208. The seller's lien is given in SAI OF GOODS Acr, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71,
§ 41; U.S.A. § 54. The right of stoppage in transit is codified in SALE OF GOODS
Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71, §§ 44-46; U.S.A. §§ 57-59.
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tions."

20 9 No

doubt, this system was felt to be more suitable to a so-

ciety which valued the producer of goods more highly than the con-

sumer, handler, or financier of goods.
In the United States -where English law was closely observed,
copied, and adapted- these tendencies were, if anything, accentuated. In the early history of the new republic, foreign trade played
a dominant role; the United States faced the sea and depended on
ocean commerce. But as the frontier extended westward, domestic
trade became more and more important. Ocean commerce, although
it never completely lost its importance, was subordinated to commerce via roads, canals, and most significantly, railroads. The bill of
lading, in a superb example of legal adaptability, became a railroad
document. The shape of the country shaped in turn the behavior of
the law of sales.
This law was a seller's law. Market overt, although it may have
in the colonies, was brusquely snuffed out in the new repubexisted
lic.2 10 It took hard cash or some definite act to strip an owner of his
financial rights. This was all to the benefit of the manufacturing interests; later, by convenient coincidence, the same doctrines proved
useful for farmer-sellers. New concepts -for example, the conditional sale - were evolved to help provide security for sellers. Within its
tight logical skeleton, the law achieved, however, a great deal of
factual subtlety. By and large, the judges were men of intelligence,
and they were willing to mold the given law to suit the needs, as they
saw them, of the national economy. The details are beyond the scope
of this Article. This was, however, the classical period; it was brilliant-but brief. It is already over. Even the Sale of Goods Act, in
England, and its American step-child, the Uniform Sales Act, are already, in a sense, post-classical. As the industrial society became more
complex, and as social and political streams changed direction, the
law of sales found itself overburdened. The law of warranties, developed with an eye to canny traders dealing on a par with each other,
sagged under the weight of an army of naive consumers, who had the
vote. The seller's security interests, originally subtle and flexible, by
the end of the nineteenth century could be criticized with some justice
as primitive. Weapons designed for the use of merchant-financiers
were poorly adapted to the needs of the installment seller of automobiles, pianos, and washing-machines. Courts and legislatures made
clever adjustments; these were sufficient for a while, but then no
209. See 13 HoLnswoRmT; HISTORY OF ENGLiSH LAw 380 (1952).
210. Ventress v. Smith, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 161 (1836); Wheelwright v. Depeyster,
1 Johns. 471 (N.Y. 1806); Lecky v. McDermott, 8 Serg. & R. 500 (Pa. 1822);
Hosack v. Weaver, 1 Yeates 478 (Pa. 1795). But it is entirely possible, if not
probable, that such an institution was thought to exist during the colonial period.
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longer. At the other end of the spectrum, the old factor's law no longer served well the needs of the larger banks. Here, too, change was
inevitable. Psychologically, also, the climate of business underwent
a shift in the twentieth century. Conscience re-entered the picture, a
desire for fairness and the balancing of interests; the buyer was now
a voter, and caveat emptor as obsolete as 'let them eat cake." The
businessman might be annoyed with the law-the consumer, perhaps, enraged with it. In the purely commercial world, the line between buyer and seller blurred in the new highly complicated industrial society. Large corporations bought and sold in vast, but roughly
equal, quantities and had equal claims on the law. The sum of these
dissatisfactions (after a period of patchwork legislation) finally culminated in the movement for the Uniform Commercial Code. The
Code is one of the most interesting legal phenomena of our day. It is
curiously atavistic in its resurrection of market-overt concepts, its
rough-hewn equity, its emphasis on the custom of businessmen and
the rules of the game. The wheel has turned full circle. The litigating
group of merchants of the eighteenth century, a one-class group and
hence effectively classless, gave way first to the sharp class-stratified
law of the nineteenth century; and this in turn has, or will, give way
to the world of the Uniform Commercial Code- classless in the
main, solicitous of each class in detail.
Thus seen, the history of Anglo-American commercial law, in its
sales branch, is neither the haphazard nor purely logical nor purely
conservative thing it is variously described as. On the contrary, at
each stage, the law is seen meeting face to face the problems of business usage and policy posed by the times. Observed from a broader
view, the history of the law of sales can be divided into three periods,
which correspond very roughly to the three centuries of its effective
life. Each period shows separate tendencies, follows separate rules;
but each responds to the commercial and social context into which it
is set; each prepares the way for the next. In this Article, we have
attempted to show some of the significance of the first - and most obscure- of the three periods. That done, the significance of the later
two becomes to that extent, it is hoped, more clear.

